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This thesis consists of three chapters. In Chapter 1, we use a unique dataset of natural
disasters, including earthquakes, floods, storms, volcanic eruptions, and wildfires, to test
whether investors suffer from behavioral bias such as underreacting to news and investor
sentiment. In Chapter 2, we study the rationale for firms’ use of inside debt (pension and
deferred compensation) by exploiting the relation between firms’ default risk and inside
debt. In Chapter 3, we research the role of inside debt in the optimal structure of chief
executive officer pay by performing a simulation analysis of investment distortions.
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CHAPTER 1
NATURAL DISASTERS
This chapter uses a unique dataset of natural disasters, including earthquakes, floods,
storms, volcanic eruptions, and wildfires, to test whether investors suffer from behavioral
bias such as underreacting to news and investor sentiment. Natural disasters represent a
natural experiment setup as they are orthogonal to macroeconomic factors and managerial
decisions. We start by assessing natural disasters’ effects on stock prices and firm character-
istics of U.S. firms. The value-weighted average four-factor-model abnormal return from the
first to 30 days after the event is -3.87% or $63 million loss per natural disaster. Abnormal
returns continue to be negative for up to 360 days following the disasters. Correspondingly,
firm profitability and investment decrease. The negative capital market response together
with decreased firm performance and more restricted investment policies support either slow
information diffusion, or investor underreaction. We find some evidence consistent with each
hypothesis. Finally, using natural disasters as a negative shock to investor sentiment, we
provide direct evidence that investor sentiment affects stock prices in a setup with arguably
little endogeneity concern.
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate the effects of natural disasters on publicly traded firms to
shed light on behavioral theories about the capital market, including investor underreaction
and investor sentiment. Natural disasters represent a natural experiment setup as they
are orthogonal to macroeconomic factors and managerial decisions. Specifically, we test
whether investors suffer from behavioral bias such as underreacting to news and whether
investors are subject to sentiment.
We use a unique dataset of natural disasters from 1970 to 2010 in the United States,
including earthquakes, floods, storms, volcanoes and wildfires. This dataset includes a
total of 47 natural disasters, which affect 241 unique counties and cause an average of
$11 billion worth of damage per event. We identify affected firms by selecting those firms
2headquartered within the counties that are reported to be affected by our sample of natural
disasters. Despite the obvious loss of life and often immense physical damage to property,
plant, and equipment, little is known about how natural disasters affect firms operating in
the disaster areas. In this chapter, we directly address the effects of natural disasters on
shareholder wealth, accounting performance, and firm operating policies. This is important
because it provides insight into firm preparedness for rare-event risk and allows for a truly
exogenous environment to evaluate investor reaction to these rare events and test behavioral
theories such as investor underreaction and sentiment.
We start by assessing natural disasters’ effects on shareholder wealth of U.S. firms by
implementing a standard event study. Intuitively, we might expect that many publically
traded firms are geographically well diversified and/or adequately insured against natural
disasters. In this sense, when their headquarters are affected by natural disasters, there
should be no direct effect on the shareholder wealth, despite the significant damage as-
sociated with natural disasters. However, we find results directly opposite to a no-effect
hypothesis. Specifically, we present new evidence of statistically significant negative ab-
normal return for firms affected by natural disasters in our sample. The value-weighted
average four-factor-model abnormal returns from event day -1 to +1 is -0.22%, growing
to a highly statistically significant -3.87% over the day 1 to day 30 window following the
disaster. Further, it decreases up to -6.1% over the day 1 to day 120 window, and then
increases to -1.39% over the day 1 to day 360 window. Thus, this result indicates that
natural disasters are associated with large negative shareholder wealth effects and that the
event returns are, on first glance, not entirely consistent with an efficient market reaction
to the event (i.e., we find evidence of continued negative returns well after the event date).
This result is robust to different models for estimating abnormal returns, and is robust to
value-weighting, square-root-of-market-capitalization weighting, and to equal weighting of
the abnormal returns.
To investigate the negative capital market response, we then look for evidence that
natural disasters affect firm characteristics, besides returns, in a way consistent with natural
disasters causing physical damages to the firm. We measure firms’ accounting performance
and policies from pre to post-disasters. We find that the accounting performance for affected
firms decreases on average post-disasters. At the same time, we find that firms decrease their
capital expenditure and tangible assets, and increase their leverage ratios. We interpret
this as evidence that natural disasters have a negative effect on both firms’ accounting
performance and investment policies. This is consistent with the possibility that firms
3are not geographically diversified and/or adequately insured against losses from natural
disasters in the United States. This is also at least partially consistent with a rational
reaction in the equity markets given that the overall negative return effect is accompanied
by deteriorating firm performance and more restricted investment policies.
Then we investigate two hypotheses that may potentially explain the negative capital
market response coupled with decreased firm performance and more restricted investment
policies (slow information diffusion or investor underreaction).
The first hypothesis, a rational behavior hypothesis, is based on Hong and Stein (1999)
which provides a rational explanation for momentum trading strategies. In their model,
there are two groups of rational investors, “news-watchers” and “momentum traders”. If
information diffuses gradually across the population, prices underreact in the short run.
This rational slow diffusion of information coupled with decreases in operating performance
would then explain the intermediate to long-term negative returns after the event. The
second hypothesis, an irrational underreaction hypothesis, which is not necessarily exclusive
of the first hypothesis, is that investors irrationally underreact to the disasters, causing
intermediate to long-term positive autocorrelation in returns.
Despite the difficulty to potentially differentiate between the two hypotheses, we try to
shed some light on which hypothesis is more consistent with our empirical results.
We first test the rational behavior hypothesis. If the negative effect on shareholder
wealth is directly related to the potential damages that natural disasters can cause to the
firm, we would expect a stronger effect for more severe disasters. Not surprisingly, we
find that firms affected by worse disasters exhibit statistically significant lower post-event
abnormal returns.1 We take this as evidence supporting the information diffusion hypothesis
as there is a direct link between the news of natural disasters and subsequent negative effect
on shareholder wealth. However, we are aware that we are making an assumption that an
irrational investor reaction is independent of the severity of the news.
To explore the rational behavior hypothesis further, we investigate a necessary condition
for this hypothesis. To the extent that the post-disaster negative capital market effect
is associated with rational behavior coupled with slow information diffusion, then at a
minimum we should observe the firm’s accounting performance and operating policies
change in a way consistent with the revealed investor response to the capital market.
Specifically, if the post-disaster negative effect is partially driven by slow diffusion of
1We use the reported insured loss as a measure for the severity of disasters, despite the fact that these
numbers will not be revealed until later.
4information, then we would expect worse accounting performance for firms experiencing
worse negative abnormal returns. We measure how changes in firm performance and policies
vary in the cross section. Indeed, we find that firms experiencing more negative abnormal
returns are associated with worse accounting performance. This result provides further
support for the rational behavior hypothesis. However, we find that firms experiencing
more negative abnormal returns are associated with less restricted investment policies. This
result supports the irrational behavior hypothesis.
We then move to test the irrational behavior hypothesis. If the negative return drifts
post-disasters can be partially attributed to irrational investor underreaction, then we
would expect that the firms where investors are more likely to underreact experience lower
negative returns in the long run. We find some marginal evidence that firms with lower
negative returns during the day -1 to 1 event window experience less negative subsequent
return. If firms that exhibit lower negative returns around the event date are also those that
investors may underreact in a longer term, then this evidence is contrary to the irrational
underreaction hypothesis. However, this result is subject to measurement errors and omitted
variables bias.
To explore the irrational behavior hypothesis further, we also investigate a necessary
condition for this hypothesis. To the extent that the post-disaster negative capital market
effect is associated with irrational behavior, then at a minimum we should observe the
post-disaster negative capital market effect is independent of the potential loss natural
disasters cause to a firm. Specifically, if the post-disaster negative effect is partially driven
by irrational underreaction, then we would expect firms with different degrees of exposure
to natural disasters experience similar negative abnormal returns. Recall that we identify
affected firms by selecting those firms headquartered within the counties that are reported
to be affected by our sample of natural disasters. We directly measure firms’ geographical
dispersion by counting the number of states mentioned in the operation section of firms’ 10-k
annual report.2 We then use this geographical dispersion measure as a proxy for the degree
of the firm’s exposure to natural disasters. Interestingly, firms that are more geographically
diversified exhibit similar negative abnormal returns following natural disasters to less
geographically-diversified firms. This result provides further support for the irrational
underreaction hypothesis.
To test the two hypotheses in a unified framework, we investigate to what extent the
2We thank Garcia Diego and Norlis Oyvind for sharing these data. In our sample, 2344 firms out of 2844
firms have this measure.
5variation in cumulative abnormal returns can be explained by changes in firms’ accounting
performance and operating policies. If the negative return drifts post-disasters can be
partially attributed to slow diffusion of information, then we would expect that the changes
in key accounting performance and operating policies, and how they affect returns, are
consistent with economic intuition. More importantly, we would expect these variables
have sufficient explanatory power for the post-disaster negative return. We find that firms
that become less profitable in face of natural disasters experience lower negative returns.
However, the explanatory power of this regression analysis is below 10%. This indicates
that our results are subject to omitted variables bias. In other words, 90% of the negative
returns cannot be explained by observable firm characteristics. We take this as evidence
supporting both the rational behavior and the irrational underreaction hypothesis.
Finally we use natural disasters as a negative shock to investor sentiment and test the
hypothesis of whether investors are subject to sentiment. Specifically, we hypothesize that
investors of those firms affected by disasters will experience a negative shock in terms of
sentiment. In the cross section, those firms that are potentially more prone to sentiment bias
(such as growth firms and past winners) before the event should experience more negative
returns.
We start by characterizing the types of firms that experience the worst returns. In
addition to lower returns for higher disaster firms, we also find that growth firms (low
book-to-market ratios) and past winners (high lagged 12-month returns) experience the
worst effects. This evidence is consistent with investor overreaction to growth firms and
past winners (Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1994); growth firms and past winners tend
to be firms that have been affected by investor sentiment and overvalued. Natural disasters
introduce a negative shock to investor sentiment and serve as a catalyst for the start of
“correction phase” for such firms. This provides direct evidence that investor sentiment
affects stock prices in a setup with arguably little endogeneity concern..
In this chapter, we document that natural disasters are followed by a statistically
significant negative effect on shareholder wealth and firms’ accounting performance. More
importantly, we find some evidence consistent with rational behavior coupled with slow
information diffusion of the events and irrational underreaction hypothesis. However, we
do not have strong evidence to rule out either hypothesis due to the limitations of our
experiments. First, the accounting information we use only becomes publicly available long
after our event window. Second, we can only explain 10% of the negative returns using
observable firm characteristics.
6In summary, we find evidence that natural disasters have negative impacts on affected
firms: firms appear to have restricted access to capital, and suffer from worse accounting
performance post-disasters. However, these impacts appear to be insufficient to explain the
negative reaction in the capital market. We also use natural disasters as a negative shock
to investor sentiment and find some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that investor
sentiment affects stock prices.
This chapter is related to both a relatively new literature of natural disasters and the
literature of market efficiency.3 As to the literature of natural disasters, a related paper
is Worthington and Valadkhani (2004). They use a unique dataset of Australian natural
disasters and find that bushfires, cyclones and earthquakes, unlike severe storms and floods,
have a major effect on the Australian capital markets. Interestingly, they find that the
effects can be either positive or negative and most effects appear on the day of the event
with only minor adjustment in the following days. As to the literature of market efficiency,
we contribute to the literature by providing new evidence on the effect of natural disasters
on shareholder wealth. We provide supporting evidence for the rational behavior hypothesis,
the irrational underreaction hypothesis, and the hypothesis that investor sentiment affects
stock prices.
1.2 Natural disasters’ effects on stock prices and firm
characteristics
1.2.1 Natural disaster sample construction
The sample of natural disasters is from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of
Disasters database “EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database” for the
period January 1971 to December 2010. The original dataset covers 671 natural disasters in
the U.S. including earthquakes, epidemics, floods, storms, droughts, extreme temperatures,
volcanoes, wildfires, and mass wet movements of land. Because our goal is to identify
the capital market’s response to the most significant natural disasters, we exclude 333
observations with missing data on total caused damage as well as the remaining six droughts,
and six extreme temperature events. From the remaining observations, we then select the
most significant natural disasters, defined as those ranked in the top 10% of the total
3Another strand of literature uses natural disasters as exogenous events to research economic questions.
For example, Barro (2006) uses rare economic disasters like World War I to explain asset-pricing puzzles
such as the high equity premium, low risk-free rate, and volatile stock returns. S. Baker and Bloom (2011)
use natural disasters, terrorist attacks and unexpected political shocks as instruments to research the causal
relation between uncertainty and growth. Morse (2011) uses natural disasters as an exogenous shock to
identify a causal relation between welfare and access to credit.
7caused damage. Finally, we identify the counties affected by natural disasters by manually
matching each natural disaster to the list of historical Presidential disaster declaration areas
obtained from the FEMA GIS data feeds (http://gis.fema.gov/DataFeeds.html). The final
sample consists of 49 natural disasters affecting 1,562 unique counties.
We use the firm headquarters address data from Compustat to identify firms affected
by natural disasters. We first geocode firm addresses and plot them on the Census county
map for the entire U.S for each decennial Census from 1970 to 2010. For each natural
disaster, we then select all firms headquartered in the affected counties during the Census
year proceeding the year of the natural disaster. The sample of firms affected by natural
disasters consists of 8,507 firm-disasters and covers 4,478 unique firms.
1.2.2 Summary statistics for natural disasters
First, we describe summary statistics for our final disaster sample. We start by col-
lecting firms’ stock return data from CRSP (The Center for Research in Security Prices).
We require that firms that are affected by our disaster sample satisfy the following two
restrictions to facilitate our empirical tests. First, we require that the firm’s stock price
61 days before the date that natural disasters happen (disaster event date) is greater than
three dollars.4 This restriction helps exclude relatively small firms. Second, we require that
firms have at least 120 observations of stock return data between 360 and 61 days before
the disaster event date. This restriction helps guarantee that we have reasonable four-factor
model alpha and betas estimates to calculate the four-factor model expected return. These
restrictions result in a final disaster dataset of 5,151 firm-disasters.
First in Table 1.1, we present the descriptive statistics for our final natural disaster
sample. We start by presenting the number of unique natural disasters, total number of
affected unique counties, total number of affected unique firms, total number of affected
firm-disasters, average damage per unique disaster and average damage per unique firm-
disaster for our final natural disaster sample. We have 47 unique natural disasters, including
earthquakes, floods, storms, volcanoes and wildfires. These disasters affect 241 unique
counties, 2844 unique firms, 5151 unique firm-disaster years, and result in an average damage
of $10,748 million per unique disaster, and an average damage of $98 million per firm-
disaster.
Next, we present relevant summary statistics for each type of natural disaster. We can
4If there is no trading activity for that particular day, then the price is calculated as the average of the
bid-ask spread.
8see that storms are the most frequent natural disaster in our sample. Thirty out of the
total 47 natural disasters are storms. The storms in our sample affect 216 unique counties
and result in an average damage of $13,684 million per disaster, and an average damage of
$120 million per firm-disaster. Floods are the second most frequent natural disaster. Seven
out of the total 47 natural disasters are floods. They affect 62 unique counties and result
in an average damage of $2,876 million per disaster, and an average damage of $30 million
per firm-disaster. However, it is worth noting that the natural disasters that results in the
highest average dollar amount of damage are earthquakes. Only 3 out of our total 47 natural
disasters are earthquakes. They affect 12 unique counties but result in an average damage
of $18,707 million per disaster, and an average damage of $165 million per firm-disaster.
Earthquakes and storms are the only two types of natural disasters that result in above
average dollar amounts of damage. Not surprisingly, storms affect the most unique counties
and firm-disaster years.
Second, we describe summary statistics for firm characteristics. We start by presenting
the size deciles of affected firms by our final disaster sample using the decile statistics of all
firms traded in New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Then we present summary statistics of
some characteristics for affected firms.
In Table 1.2 we use the firm’s market capitalization 61 days before the disaster event
date and report the dispersion of market capitalization for our sample using the NYSE decile
breakpoints calculated as of the disaster event date. The sample clearly tilts toward small
capitalization firms. This may be due to the fact that larger market capitalization firms in
the United States cluster on the coasts, and natural disasters in our sample randomly spread
out across the United States. There are 4,148 total firm-disaster years that lie below decile
5, representing 81% of our total firm-disaster observations. This is the decile distribution
if we use the decile break points of all NYSE firms for the same year and month as the
61 days before the disaster happened. If we use the median market capitalization of all
NYSE firms during years 1970 to 2010, which is $393 million, 65% of all 5,151 firm disaster
observations are below the median value of $393 million.
Third, we provide summary statistics for firm characteristics that we use in our regression
analysis presented in the empirical test section. We further require that firms in our final
disaster sample satisfy the following two restrictions. In our regression analysis, we analyze
firms’ day 1 to day 30 abnormal return. Hence the first requirement is that firms have
non-missing abnormal return data for each day in the day 1 to day 30 event window. Second,
we require that the firm has non-missing data for all chosen explanatory firm characteristics.
9These restrictions result in a final sample of 4868 firm-disasters.
In Table 1.3, we provide summary statistics of related firm characteristics used in
our empirical analysis. The affected firms in our sample have an average research and
development expense of 0.05 and an average of capital expenditure of 0.07. Tangibility is
0.28 on average. Book-to-market equity is 0.60. Log (sales) is 5.21 on average. Dividend
payout ratio is 0.63 on average. Book leverage is 0.2 on average. The last 12 months’
cumulative holding return is 26%. Return on assets is on average 0.002, while profitability
is 0.095 on average. Net income is 0.001 on average.
1.2.3 Event study of natural disasters
We start by performing a standard event study following natural disasters and present
cumulative abnormal return for various event windows. Then we characterize the type
of firms that get affected the most by natural disasters. Finally, we research whether
the reaction to natural disasters can be rationalized with corresponding changes in firm
performance and policies.
In the event study, we calculate two types of abnormal returns at firm level. First, we
calculate the four-factor-model abnormal return. For each firm, we use firms’ stock return
from 360 to 61 days preceding the disaster event date to estimate the four-factor model.
The four pricing factors are market, HML, SMB and momentum. This gives us the alpha
(the intercept) and four beta estimates for the four-factor model. To guarantee estimate
accuracy, we require that firms in our final sample have at least 120 observations to calculate
alpha and betas. We then use the estimated alpha and betas to calculate the four-factor
model expected return for each day, from day 1 to day 360 following the disaster event
date. And the four-factor-model abnormal return is calculated by subtracting expected
return from raw return. Second, we calculate the CAPM abnormal return. The procedure
to calculate CAPM abnormal return is similar to the four-factor-model abnormal return,
except that we only have one marketing pricing factor instead of four factors.
In Table 1.4 we report abnormal returns for various event windows and associated t-
statistics, using three different ways to weight individual firms’ return data.5 Our weighting
methodologies include 1) using -61 day market capitalization to value weight return; 2) using
square root of -61 day market capitalization to value weight return; 3) equal weight return.
Refer to Table 1.4, we report the four-factor-model abnormal return using three weighting
5In Appendix B, we provide a detailed description of how we calculate cumulative abnormal return and
associated t-statistics.
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methodologies. For each event window, we simply add the individual day abnormal return.
For example, following natural disasters day 2 to 15, day 1 to day 30, day 1 to day 90, and
day 1 to day 120, respectively, earn a statistically significant value-weighted four-factor-
model abnormal return of -1.58%, -3.87%, -5% and -6.1%. Using square root of value and
equal weighting methodologies, the results are stronger in the sense that we get statistically
significant return for all selected windows.
Refer to Table 1.4, we report the CAPM abnormal return using three weighting method-
ologies. Similarly, for each event window, we simply add the individual day abnormal return.
For example, following natural disasters day 2 to 15, day 1 to day 30, day 1 to day 90, day 1
to day 120, and day 1 to day 360, respectively, earn a statistically significant value-weighted
CAPM abnormal return of -2.1%, -4.39%, -6.41%, -10.28% and -15.92%. Using square root
of value and equal weighting methodologies, the results are similar.6
We also graph the cumulative abnormal return, both the four-factor-model abnormal
return and CAPM abnormal return using all three weighting methodologies in Figure 1.1 to
1.3. Consistent with Table 1.4, Figure 1.1 also shows that the cumulative four-factor-model
abnormal returns earned around the declaration date of natural disasters are negative and
the results are stronger when we use square root of value and equal weighting methodology.
1.2.4 Changes in firm accounting performance and operating policies
To investigate the negative capital market response, we then look for evidence that
natural disasters affect firm characteristics, besides returns, in a way consistent with natural
disasters causing physical damages to the firm. We measure firms’ accounting performance
and policies from pre to post-disasters. Refer to Table 1.5, we find that the accounting
performance for affected firms decreases on average post-disasters. At the same time, we
find that firms decrease their capital expenditure and tangible assets, and increase their
leverage ratios. We interpret this as evidence that natural disasters have a negative effect
on both firms’ accounting performance and investment policies. This is consistent with the
possibility that firms are not geographically diversified and/or adequately insured against
losses from natural disasters in the United States. This is also at least partially consistent
with a rational reaction in the equity markets given that the overall negative return effect
is accompanied by deteriorating firm performance and more restricted investment policies.
6It is worth noting that using CAPM model gives us larger negative abnormal returns. This is consistent
with the fact that our sample tilts toward small capitalization firms. Hence, it is important to control for
SMB pricing factor when we calculate abnormal return in our sample.
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1.3 Hypothesis development
In Section 1.2, we document that natural disasters are followed by a statistically signifi-
cant negative reaction in the capital market and firm profitability and investment decrease.
In this section, we present two hypotheses that may potentially explain our results.
The first hypothesis, a rational behavior hypothesis, is based on Hong and Stein (1999)
which provides a rational explanation for momentum trading strategies. In their model,
there are two groups of rational investors, “news-watchers” and “momentum traders”. If
information diffuses gradually across the population, prices underreact in the short run.
This rational slow diffusion of information coupled with decreases in operating performance
would then explain the negative returns.
The second hypothesis, an irrational underreaction hypothesis, which is not necessarily
exclusive of the first hypothesis, is that investors irrationally underreact to the disasters,
causing intermediate to long-term positive autocorrelation in returns.
1.4 Empirical tests of the two hypotheses
Natural disasters represent an exogenous event that is in nature uncorrelated with firm
and investor characteristics. In this sense, natural disasters serve as an ideal testing ground
for various models of investor behavior. We exploit natural disasters to differentiate the
two hypotheses for investor behavior in response to news related to disasters.
1.4.1 Subsample analysis on the basis of natural disaster severity
In Section 1.3.1, we show that natural disasters are followed by a statistically significant
negative abnormal return. If the negative effect on the capital market is directly linked to the
news of natural disasters, we would expect a stronger effect for more severe disasters. In this
section, we directly test this intuition by performing standard event studies in subsamples.
We first sort our disaster sample, a total of 47 disasters, into two groups based on the
total damage. Then we assign firms into high and low disaster firm group based on whether
the firm-disaster year is affected by a high or low damage disaster. In our final sample,
44% (5151 observations) is assigned to the low disaster group. This gives us a relatively
balanced dispersion between the low and high disaster group. Refer to Table 1.6 Panel A,
the negative effect of natural disasters is statistically stronger for the high disaster damage
group for all windows except the day 1 to day 360 window. This evidence reinforces the
link between the news of natural disasters and subsequent negative reaction in the capital
market.
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1.4.2 Changes in firm performance and policies post-disasters
In this section, we explore a necessary condition for the rational behavior hypothesis. To
the extent that the post-disaster negative effect is associated with rational behavior coupled
with slow information diffusion, then at a minimum we should observe the firm’s accounting
performance and operating policies change in a way consistent with the revealed investor
response to the capital market. Specifically, if the post-disaster negative effect is primarily
driven by slow diffusion of information, then we would expect worse firm performance for
firms experiencing worse negative abnormal returns. We directly measure how changes in
firm performance and policies vary in the cross section. Indeed, refer to Table 1.7, we
find that firms experiencing more negative abnormal returns are associated with worse
accounting performance. This result provides further support for the rational behavior
hypothesis.
1.4.3 Analysis using firms’ exposure to natural disaster
To explore the irrational behavior hypothesis further, we also investigate a necessary
condition for this hypothesis. To the extent that the post-disaster negative capital market
effect is associated with irrational behavior, then at a minimum we should observe the
post-disaster negative capital market effect is independent of the potential loss natural
disasters cause to a firm. Specifically, if the post-disaster negative effect is partially driven
by irrational underreaction, then we would expect firms with different degrees of exposure
to natural disasters experience similar negative abnormal returns. Recall that we identify
affected firms by selecting those firms headquartered within the counties that are reported
to be affected by our sample of natural disasters. We directly measure firms’ geographical
dispersion by counting the number of states mentioned in the operation section of firms’ 10-k
annual report. We then use this geographical dispersion measure as a proxy for the degree
of the firm’s exposure to natural disasters. Interestingly, firms that are more geographically
diversified exhibit similar negative abnormal returns following natural disasters to less
geographically-diversified firms. This result in Table 1.6 Panel B provides further support
for the irrational underreaction hypothesis.
1.4.4 A unified test of the two hypotheses
To test the two hypotheses in a unified framework, we investigate to what extent the
variation in cumulative abnormal returns can be explained by changes in firms’ accounting
performance and operating policies. If the negative return drifts post-disasters can be
partially attributed to slow diffusion of information, then we would expect that the changes
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in key accounting performance and operating policies, and how they affect returns, are
consistent with economic intuition. More importantly, we would expect these variables
have sufficient explanatory power for the post-disaster negative return.
Refer to Table 1.8, we regress four-factor-model abnormal return from day 1 to day 30
following natural disasters on changes in some key firm performance and policy variables,
including tangibility, profitability, dividend payout ratio, and book leverage. We also include
some key firm characteristics that have been shown to be correlated with post-disaster
abnormal return, including market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, past 12 months’
return and a disaster indicator that takes disaster damage into consideration. To construct
the disaster rank variable, we first sort our final disaster sample, a total of 47 disasters,
into two groups based on the total damage with Group 1 as the low disaster damage group
and Group 2 as the high disaster damage group. Then we assign firms into high and low
disaster firm group based on whether the firm-disaster year is affected by a high or low
damage disaster. The disaster rank variable is equal to zero if the firm belongs to Group 1,
and one if the firm belongs to Group 2.
Focusing on the coefficients of variables describing changes in firms’ performance and
policies, we find that firms that become less profitable in face of natural disasters experi-
ence lower abnormal returns. We take this as evidence supporting the rational behavior
hypothesis. However, the explanatory power of this regression analysis is below 10%. This
indicates that our results are subject to omitted variables bias. In other words, 90% of the
negative returns cannot be explained by observable firm characteristics. We take this as
evidence supporting both the rational behavior and the irrational underreaction hypothesis.
1.5 Empirical test of investor sentiment
In this section, we use natural disasters as a negative shock to investor sentiment and test
the hypothesis of whether investors are subject to sentiment. Specifically, we hypothesize
that investors of those firms affected by disasters will experience a negative shock in terms of
sentiment. In the cross section, those firms that are potentially more prone to sentiment bias
(such as growth firms and past winners) before the event should experience more negative
returns.
Specifically, we investigate what type of firms get affected the most from natural disasters
in a regression format. We regress firms’ abnormal return (four-factor-model abnormal
return and CAPM abnormal return) on firm characteristics that may correlate with the
degree that the firm suffers from natural disasters according to economic intuition and
theory. More importantly, we test whether those firms that are potentially more prone to
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sentiment bias (such as growth firms and past winners) before the event actually experience
more negative returns after investors are subject to negative sentiment shock. Namely, we
use natural disasters as a shock to investor sentiment to test whether the capital market is
subject to investor sentiment.
M. Baker and Wurgler (2006) show that investor sentiment affects the cross-section of
stock returns. They hypothesize that investor sentiment has larger effects on securities that
are hard to value and difficult to arbitrage, for example growth stocks. Then they show
that this type of stocks experience subsequent lower (higher) returns if sentiment is high
(low) at the beginning period. We have a setup where natural disasters introduce a shock
to investor sentiment. This helps us test investor sentiment with arguably little endogeneity
problems. Following the argument in M. Baker and Wurgler (2006), we hypothesize that
following a negative shock to investor sentiment, the type of stocks that are potentially
affected more by sentiment will experience lower returns.
In Table 1.9, we provide empirical results when we regress abnormal return on firm
characteristics. We select day 1 to day 30 abnormal return as the dependent variable because
this event window has shown consistent statistically significant negative abnormal return
when we use various weighting methodologies. We have performed the same regression
specifications using day 2 to day 90 abnormal return, and get similar results. All regres-
sions include industry and year fixed effects to control for any unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity across industries and calendar years.7 The inclusion of fixed effects thus
identifies the average within-industry and within-year changes in the dependent variables
as a function of the independent variables in the regressions.
In addition to lower returns for higher disaster firms (we document this in Section 1.4.1),
we also find that growth firms (low book-to-market ratios) and past winners (high lagged
12-month returns) experience the worst effects. This evidence is consistent with investor
overreaction to growth firms and past winners (Lakonishok et al., 1994). Growth firms
and past winners tend to be firms that are affected by sentiment and overvalued. Natural
disasters introduce a negative shock to investor sentiment and serve as a catalyst for the start
of “correction phase” for such firms. This provides direct evidence that investor sentiment
affects stock prices.
In summary, we test the hypothesis of whether investors are subject to sentiment. Specif-
ically, we hypothesize that the investors of the firms affected by disasters will experience a
7Industry definitions can be found at the following link. We use 30 industries to guarantee enough number
of firms in each industry. http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html
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negative shock in terms of sentiment. In the cross section, those firms that are potentially
more prone to sentiment bias (such as growth firms and past winners) before the event
should experience more negative returns. We find evidence consistent with this prediction.
1.6 Summary
This chapter provides new evidence of the effect of natural disasters on the capital
markets and contemporaneous changes in firm performance and firm policies. We use a
unique dataset of various natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, storms, volcanoes
and wildfires from 1970 to 2010 in the United States. These disasters result in an average
of $11 billion in infrastructure damage per event. We perform an event study and find that
the value-weighted average four-factor-model abnormal returns 30 days following natural
disasters is approximately -3.87%, which translates into $63 million loss in shareholder
wealth per firm-event. This negative effect continues for up to 360 days following the
disasters. At the same time, firm profitability and investment decrease. This negative
effect coupled with decreased firm performance and more restricted investment policies
can be attributed to either rational behavior together with slow information diffusion, or
irrational investor underreaction.
We find some evidence consistent with both hypotheses. First, we show that firms
affected by worse disasters experience more negative post-disaster returns. Further, these
firms also exhibit worse firm profitability. We take these as evidence supporting the rational
behavior hypothesis. However, firms affected by worse disasters experience less restricted
investment policies. Also, firms with less exposure to natural disasters show similar negative
post-disaster returns to those with more exposure. We take these as evidence supporting
the irrational underreaction hypothesis. Finally, changes in observable firm characteristics
can only explain less than 10% of the negative post-disaster returns. In a nutshell, we do not
have strong evidence to rule out either hypothesis due to the limitations of our experiments.
Finally, using natural disasters as a negative shock to investor sentiment, we test the
hypothesis of whether investors are subject to sentiment. Specifically, we hypothesize that
investors of those firms affected by disasters will experience a negative shock in terms of
sentiment. In the cross section, those firms that are potentially more prone to sentiment bias
(such as growth firms and past winners) before the event should experience more negative
returns. Indeed, we find that growth firms (low book-to-market ratios) and past winners
(high lagged 12-month returns) experience the worst effects. This evidence is consistent with
investor overreaction to growth firms and past winners (Lakonishok et al., 1994). Growth
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firms and past winners tend to be firms that are affected by sentiment and overvalued.
Natural disasters introduce a negative shock to investor sentiment and serve as a catalyst
for the start of correction phase for such firms. This provides direct evidence that investor
sentiment affects stock prices.
In summary, we find evidence that natural disasters have negative impacts on affected
firms: firms appear to have restricted access to capital, and suffer from worse accounting
performance post-disasters. However, these impacts appear to be insufficient to explain
the negative reaction in the capital market. We provide supporting evidence for investor
underreaction to natural disasters. Finally, we use natural disasters as a shock to investor
sentiment and find some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that investor sentiment
affects stock prices.
We contribute to the literature by exploiting exogenous events of various natural disas-
ters and provide new evidence for investor underreaction and investor sentiment. Natural
disasters, by definition exogenous events, serve as an ideal testing ground for behavioral
models. We provide supporting evidence for both theories in a setting with arguably little

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.2: Size deciles of affected firm-disasters.
This table reports 10 size deciles of our final sample of firm-disasters. The final sample of
firm-disasters should satisfy the following two restrictions: first, we require that the firm’
stock price 61 days preceding the disaster event date is greater than three dollars; second,
we require that the firm has a minimum of 120 non-missing stock return data between 360
and 61 days preceding the disaster event date. The second restriction helps guarantee that
we have reasonable four-factor model betas and alpha estimates to calculate the four-factor
model expected return. These restrictions result in a final dataset of 5,151 firm-disasters.
The breakpoints for the size (market capitalization, i.e., price times shares outstanding) are
determined at the same time as the disaster event date using all New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) stocks on CRSP (The Center for Research in Security Prices). We use the firm’s
market capitalization 61 days preceding the natural disaster event date. And we categorize
the firm-disasters into 10 deciles.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.6: Event study of subsamples.
This table reports the results of our event study for subsamples on the basis of disaster
damage amount and the firm’s geographical dispersion. In Panel A, we first sort our final
disaster sample, a total of 47 disasters, into two groups based on the total damage with
Group 1 as the low-disaster-damage group and Group 2 as the high-disaster-damage group.
Then we assign firms into high and low disaster firm group based on whether the firm-
disaster year is affected by a high or low damage disaster. In Panel B, we first select
firms that we have an available geographical dispersion rank, with Group 1 as the low-
geographical-dispersion group and Group 2 as the high-geographical-dispersion group. The
geographical-dispersion-measure is the number of unique state counts mentioned in firms’
10-k. In our sample, 2344 firms out of 2844 firms have this measure. The reported return
for each window is the cumulative equal-weighted four-factor-model abnormal return (all
expressed in percentage). T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The methodology to
calculate cumulative return and corresponding t-statistic is outlined in Appendix B. In the
final rows, we report p-values for tests of the null hypothesis of equality of mean and median
across the two groups using an F-test and Kruskal and Wallis χ2 test, respectively.
Panel A
Event period (in days)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-15 to -2 -1 to 1 -2 to 2 2 to 15 2 to 30 1 to 90 1 to 120 1 to 360
All -1.06 -0.44 -0.42 -0.97 -2.38 -3.57 -5.37 -11.91
(-4.41) (-3.44) (-2.74) (-3.29) (-5.49) (-5.89) (-6.26) (-8.01)
Group 1 -0.68 -0.21 0.13 -0.10 -1.05 -1.55 -3.37 -10.17
(-2.24) (-0.17) (0.60) (-0.24) (-1.67) (-1.75) (-2.69) (-4.69)
Group 2 -1.36 -0.62 -0.87 -1.67 -3.45 -5.19 -6.98 -13.30
(-3.09) (-3.22) (-3.32) (-3.63) (-5.21) (-5.53) (-5.25) (-5.78)
F-test 0.0449 0.0374 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 0.0252 0.0052 0.2213
χ2 test 0.0298 0.296 0.0002 < .0001 0.0004 0.0455 0.0127 0.5759
Panel B
Event period (in days)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-15 to -2 -1 to 1 -2 to 2 2 to 15 2 to 30 1 to 90 1 to 120 1 to 360
All -1.00 -0.43 -0.37 -0.95 -2.39 -3.41 -5.24 -11.97
(-4.10) (-3.52) (-2.56) (-3.36) (-5.88) (-5.90) (-6.41) (-8.46)
Group 1 -1.03 -0.47 -0.33 -1.02 -2.74 -3.52 -5.43 -13.79
(-2.97) (-2.78) (-1.65) (-2.68) (-4.98) (-4.51) (-4.92) (-7.21)
Group 2 -0.98 -0.39 -0.40 -0.88 -2.08 -3.31 -5.06 -10.35
(-3.51) (-2.91) (-2.28) (-3.01) (-4.94) (-5.43) (-5.88) (-6.94)
F-test 0.1560 0.0341 0.0016 0.1179 0.2346 0.1419 0.0658 0.5191



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.8: Industry and year fixed-effect regressions describing individual firm abnormal
return following disasters.
This table provides results for our regression analysis that explore the relation between
individual firm level abnormal return and the changes of firm characteristics from pre- to
post- disasters. We use annual accounting data and the change in each firm characteristic
is calculated as the most recent available firm characteristic post- disaster minus the last
available firm characteristic pre- disaster. We adjust the variable pre- and post- disaster
by both industry and firm size. For independent variables, we include the changes in
tangibility, profitability, dividend payout ratio, book leverage, log (market capitalization),
and the levels of book-to-market, last 12 months return, the disaster rank, day -1 to day 1
four-factor-model abnormal return and a constant. To construct the disaster rank variable,
we first sort our final disaster sample, a total of 47 disasters, into two groups based on
the total damage with Group 1 as the low-disaster-damage group and Group 2 as the
high-disaster-damage group. Then we assign firms into high and low disaster firm group
based on whether the firm-disaster year is affected by a high or low damage disaster. The
disaster rank variable is equal to zero if the firm belongs to Group 1, and one if the firm
belongs to Group 2. The table reports t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered
at the industry level in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Significance at
the 1, 5, and 10% levels are signified with ***, **, and *, respectively.
Day 1 to day 30 Day 1 to day 30
Four-factor-model CAPM
abnormal return abnormal return
Change in tangibility -7.108 -7.377
(-1.14) (-1.24)
Change in profitability 8.329*** 7.501***
(3.71) (3.51)
Change in dividend payout ratio -0.481 -0.254
(-0.84) (-0.54)
Change in book leverage -5.547* -5.468*
(-1.79) (-1.96)




Last 12 months’ return -5.227*** -5.291***
(-9.20) (-9.56)
Disaster indicator -3.143** -4.862***
(-2.59) (-4.16)
Day -1 to day 1 -0.0784* -0.0566
four-factor-model abnormal return (-1.96) (-1.51)
N 4815 4815
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.098
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Table 1.9: Industry and year fixed-effect regressions describing individual firm abnormal
return following disasters.
This table provides industry and year fixed-effect regressions that explore the cross-sectional
variation of firm-level abnormal returns following natural disasters. The dependent variable
is the firm’s day 1 to day 30 cumulative abnormal return. We calculate cumulative
abnormal return for the event windows for each individual firm and require firms to have
non-missing abnormal return data for each day in the event window. Then we require
that the firm-disaster has non-missing data for all chosen explanatory firm characteristics.
These restrictions result in a final sample of 4868 firm-disasters for the day 1 to day
30 window. We implement industry and year fixed-effect regression for each type of
abnormal return and report the coefficients on each chosen firm characteristic. We adjust
all independent variables by both industry and firm size except the disaster indicator,
log (market capitalization), last 12 months’ return and day -1 to day 1 four-factor-model
abnormal return. We first sort all firms into 30 industries and for each industry we sort
the firms into two groups based on the firm’s market capitalization 61 day before the
disaster event date. Then we subtract the median of each group from each variable for the
adjustment. Variables are defined in Appendix A. The methodology to calculate cumulative
return and corresponding t-statistic is outlined in Appendix B. The table reports t-statistics
based on robust standard errors clustered at the industry level in parentheses. Significance
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels are signified with ***, **, and *, respectively.
Day 1 to day 30 Day 1 to day 30
Four-factor-model CAPM
abnormal return abnormal return








Dividend payout ratio -0.289 -0.260
(-0.44) (-0.41)
Last 12 months’ return -4.846*** -4.952***
(-8.96) (-9.59)
Book leverage 0.465 0.248
(0.23) (0.13)
Disaster indicator -3.260** -4.942***
(-2.41) (-3.83)
Day -1 to day 1 -0.0611 -0.0422
four-factor-model abnormal return (-1.56) (-1.15)
N 4868 4868













































































































































































Figure 1.1: Cumulative value-weighted abnormal return.
These figures show the cumulative value-weighted abnormal return using both the four-
factor-model and the CAPM model to calculate expected return. For each model, we show
the cumulative value-weighted abnormal return from 60 days before to 360 days after the
natural disaster event date. Variables are defined in Appendix A. The methodology to














































































































































































Figure 1.2: Cumulative square-root-of-value-weighted abnormal return.
These figures show the cumulative square-root-of-value-weighted abnormal return using
both the four-factor-model (Panel A) and the CAPM model (Panel B) to calculate expected
return. For each model, we show the cumulative square-root-of-value-weighted abnormal
return from 60 days before to 360 days after the natural disaster event date. Variables


















































































































































































Figure 1.3: Cumulative equal-weighted abnormal return.
These figures show the cumulative equal-weighted abnormal return using both the four-
factor-model (Panel A) and the CAPM model (Panel B) to calculate expected return. For
each model, we show the cumulative equal-weighted abnormal return from 60 days before
to 360 days after the natural disaster event date. Variables are defined in Appendix A. The
methodology to calculate cumulative return is outlined in Appendix B.
CHAPTER 2
INSIDE DEBT AND DEBT INCENTIVES
We study the rationale for firms’ use of inside debt by exploiting the relation between
firms’ default risk and inside debt (pension and deferred compensation). The classical
principal-agent theory indicates that the agency costs of debt are higher when the firm’s debt
is riskier. We test whether firms that are likely to face more severe agency problems of debt
provide more debt incentives. We provide evidence that less distressed firms use more inside
debt. The 2008 financial crisis significantly increases firms’ default risk. This exogenous
shift in firms’ default risk offers an opportunity to provide evidence on the potential causal
relation between default risk and inside debt. Based on a difference-in-differences approach,
we find that firms with increased default risk during the crisis period increase their debt
incentives significantly less than those firms with decreased default risk. Overall, we find
little evidence consistent with the conventional wisdom that more distressed firms use more
debt incentives to alleviate the agency costs of debt. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
personal tax concerns appear to be an important determinant for inside debt usage.
2.1 Introduction
Inside debt refers to the part of executive compensation with payoffs similar to those
of debt securities held by external investors. It usually includes both pension and deferred
compensation. As inside debt represents unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, it
exposes chief executive officers (CEOs) to default risk. In this sense, Jensen and Meckling
(1976) argue that inside debt aligns CEO incentives with those of external debt holders
and induces less risky firm policies. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) hand collect pension
data for 237 large capitalization firms. They show that CEOs receive significant amounts of
pension and interpret this result as evidence that CEO compensation exhibits a balance
between debt incentives and equity incentives. In 2007, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) disclosure reform required firms to disclose CEO’s inside debt positions.
This provides publicly-available inside debt data from calendar year 2007 onward. Wei
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and Yermack (2011) show that for firms with sizeable inside debt, bond prices rise and
equity prices fall in response to the disclosure in 2007. They interpret their results as
market reaction evidence that inside debt is used to align managerial incentives with
those of outside creditors. Cassell, Huang, Manuel, and Stuart (2012) further show that
inside debt is correlated with less risky investment and financial policies. Specifically,
they show that CEO inside debt holdings are positively correlated with asset liquidity and
negatively correlated with research and development expenditures and financial leverage.
They interpret their results as evidence that large inside debt holdings induce lower levels
of risk-seeking behavior.
Overall the empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical argument that inside
debt helps alleviate agency costs of debt and align managerial incentives with those of debt
holders. However, the existing evidence has largely been indirect tests of the agency theory.
The agency problem between the manager and debt holders (project selection problems such
as, debt overhang or asset substitution) indicates that for firms with risky debt, managers
may forgo positive net-present-value (NPV) projects or invest in negative NPV projects at
the expense of debt holders. Firms with riskier debt are likely to face more severe agency
problems of debt. Thus, firms with riskier debt are precisely those that need to provide
more debt incentives all else equal. Edmans and Liu (2011) formalize this insight in an
equilibrium model. In this paper, we provide direct evidence by empirically exploring this
largely ignored insight. We accomplish this task by researching the causal effect of firms’
default risk, which proxies for the riskiness of debt, on inside debt.
We start by testing whether inside debt is correlated with firms’ default risk. Following
Jensen and Meckling (1976), we measure inside debt by the ratio of debt pay-performance
sensitivity to equity pay-performance sensitivity. The intuition is that this measure weighs
the relative benefits from aligning incentives related to project selection and effort problems.
Edmans and Liu (2011) show that when firms are financially healthy, they usually have
an equity bias (i.e., debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity ratio smaller than one) to
induce effort. When bankruptcy is likely, firms tend to have a debt bias (i.e., debt to equity
pay-performance sensitivity ratio greater than one) to manage the project selection problem.
Empirically, the debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity ratio is proxied by CEO to firm
leverage ratio, which is defined as the CEO inside debt to firm debt ratio scaled by the inside
equity to firm equity ratio. Contrary to the prediction of agency theory, we show that there
is a negative correlation between various default risk measures and CEO to firm leverage
ratio. Next we show that this relation is robust to controlling for other factors (firm size,
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leverage, research and development expense, and CEO age) that have been shown to be
correlated with inside debt. We interpret this as the first piece of evidence indicating that
incentive alignment does not appear to be a first-order determinant of inside debt usage.
The negative correlation between firms’ default risk and inside debt is plagued by the
universal endogeneity issue in empirical corporate finance both default risk and inside debt
are simultaneously determined in equilibrium and the causation can be in either direction.
For example, Sundaram and Yermack (2007) show that firms with higher CEO pension to
equity ratios scaled by firm leverage have lower default risk. They interpret this result as
evidence that pension helps reduce the riskiness of the firm’s external debt. We show that
for firms that need to provide more debt incentives (i.e., firms with higher default risk),
CEO to firm leverage ratios are lower. We interpret this result as evidence contradicting
the empirical prediction of an equilibrium model where inside debt is used to provide debt
incentives. To shed light on the causal relation between default risk and inside debt, we use
the 2008 financial crisis as an exogenous shift in firms’ default risk.
The 2008 financial crisis originates from the 2007 credit crisis and leads to an increase
in average firm-level default risk. Specifically, one of our default risk measures, Altman’s
Z-score, decreases from 3.97 in 2007 to 3.15 in 2008, a 26% decrease. At the same time,
the financial crisis is not likely to be associated with significant changes in firm or CEO
fundamentals related to debt incentive alignment other than default risk (e.g., firm size or
CEO age). This helps mitigate the confounding effects that might bias our experiment. To
the extent that the shift in default risk is exogenous, a difference-in-differences approach
can potentially identify the causal relation between default risk and inside debt. We show
that during the crisis period firms with increased default risk increase their inside debt
significantly less than those firms with decreased default risk. This result is robust to
various proxies for firms’ default risk. Further, this main result remains after controlling
for cross-sectional heterogeneity. The results suggest that default risk has a causal effect
on inside debt. However, this negative relation indicates that when firms become more
distressed, they do not increase their debt incentives in a manner consistent with the
theoretical prediction. Overall, we find little evidence consistent with the conventional
wisdom that more distressed firms use more debt incentives to alleviate the agency costs of
debt.
It is puzzling why less distressed firms use more inside debt. A possible reason is related
to personal tax concerns. Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010) show that tax benefits play an
important role in all-employee pension usage. Specifically, the firm-level tax shields from
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pension contributions are about a third of those from interest payments. However, the
firm-level tax benefit generated from CEO pension and deferred compensation is relatively
small compared to the all-employee tax benefit. We provide some anecdotal evidence that
personal tax concerns appear to be an important determinant of CEO inside debt. For
example, Alberto-Culver’s proxy statement notes that pension and deferred compensation
help executives “accumulate funds on a tax favored basis.” Specifically, CEOs can defer
the tax payments on pension and deferred compensation until withdrawal. This deferral
feature benefits the CEO in two dimensions: 1) if the CEO’s tax rate does not change in the
future, it lowers the present value of his/her tax on the deferred amount; 2) if the CEO’s
tax rate is lower in the future, then the tax on the deferred amount is lower in addition to
the time value of money mentioned in part one.
In a nutshell, the rationale of debt incentives is straightforward and appears to be
supported by prior empirical evidence. However, there is no formal analysis that directly
tests whether firms that need to provide more debt incentives use more inside debt. We fill
this gap by linking firms’ default risk to inside debt. We show that less distressed firms use
more inside debt. This result contradicts the traditional wisdom that firms with risky debt
are precisely those who will benefit from debt incentive alignment. Although it is beyond
this paper’s scope to provide first-order determinants of inside debt holdings, we conjecture
that personal tax concerns may be an important determinant.
2.2 Data and summary statistics
2.2.1 Summary statistics for the full sample
We start by collecting different components of CEO compensation (including salary,
bonus, stock options, stock holdings, pension, and deferred compensation) from the Exe-
cuComp Database. Because ExecuComp starts to report complete information on inside
debt holdings (including pension and deferred compensation) from 2006 onward, we restrict
our sample period to fiscal years 2006 through 2010. In addition, we remove firms in the
financial (firms with SIC code between 6000 and 6999) and utility (firms with SIC code
between 4900 and 4999) industries. As part of our empirical analysis is to evaluate how
firms react to the 2008 financial crisis, we further restrict the sample to those firms with
non-missing inside debt data for both fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Finally, we require all
firm-year observations have non-missing data for our main default risk measure (Z-score)
and key determinants of inside debt, such as CEO age, firm size, firm leverage, and research
and development expense. This results in a final sample of 4,608 firm-year observations.
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To measure inside debt usage, we focus on two variables: total dollar value of inside debt
(CEO inside debt holdings), total dollar value of inside debt scaled by cash compensation
(CEO inside debt to cash compensation ratio). To measure debt incentives, we focus on
two variables: CEO inside debt to firm debt ratio scaled by the inside equity to firm equity
ratio (CEO to firm leverage ratio) and CEO relative incentive ratio defined in Wei and
Yermack (2011). As mentioned in the introduction, we use CEO to firm leverage ratio as
our main debt incentive measure. Under the assumption that CEO inside debt and inside
equity are a fixed proportion of firm debt and firm equity, CEO to firm leverage ratio is the
ratio of debt pay-performance sensitivity to equity pay-performance sensitivity. Edmans
and Liu (2011) note that intuitively CEO to firm leverage ratio < 1 indicates an equity
incentive bias and CEO to firm leverage ratio > 1 indicates a debt incentive bias. All four
variables are winsorized at the upper 1 percentile to avoid data errors and outliers. We do
not winsorize these four variables at the lower 1 percentile as they are truncated at zero.
In Table 2.1, we present summary statistics for our full sample including 4,608 firm-year
observations. We start by presenting different components of debt incentives and equity
incentives in CEO compensation. Inside debt refers to pension and differed compensation.
These types of compensation are considered “debt like” as their payoffs are similar to those
of the debt securities held by external investors and they represent unsecured and unfunded
liabilities of the firm. The average total outstanding CEO pension is $2.8 million and it is
worthwhile noting that the median is zero. The average total outstanding CEO deferred
compensation is $2.3 million. We report the average annual CEO cash compensation
(salary plus bonus), which is $1 million, for easy interpretation of the magnitude of inside
debt. The total outstanding equity incentives appear larger in magnitude compared to debt
incentives. The average total outstanding CEO options are $14 million. And the average
total outstanding CEO stock holdings are $41 million. This set of summary statistics
confirms the result in Sundaram and Yermack (2007) that CEO compensation exhibits
a balance between debt and equity incentives, and inside debt is an important part of
compensation. Next, we present various measures of inside debt. The dollar value of total
outstanding inside debt (CEO Inside debt holdings) is $5.2 million on average. Note that this
variable is highly right skewed. There are 1,420 firm-year observations that have zero CEO
Inside debt holdings, while 290 firms have zero inside debt for the full sample period. The
dollar value of total outstanding inside debt scaled by the current year’s cash compensation
(CEO Inside debt to cash compensation ratio) is 4.6 on average. This indicates that the total
dollar value of inside debt is approximately 4.6 times annual cash compensation. Further,
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CEO inside debt to firm debt ratio scaled by the inside equity to firm equity ratio (CEO to
firm leverage ratio) is on average 2.97. CEO relative incentive ratio is on average 2.23.
The classical agency theory indicates that debt incentives are only relevant in firms with
risky debt. Further, firms with riskier debt are more likely to face more severe project
selection problems. Hence we need a proxy for the riskiness of the firm’s debt. In this
chapter, we use four default risk measures to proxy the riskiness of debt. The first measure
is Z-score introduced in Altman (1968). Altman’s Z-score is a comprehensive measure for
the financial health of a company. It is a weighted average of various accounting and market
data typically associated with a firm’s financial health. Higher Z-scores indicate that the
firm is less likely to become distressed. As in Altman (1968), a Z-score of less than 1.81
signifies that bankruptcy is likely. A Z-score between 2.99 and 1.81 is a “gray area” that
signifies distress, but not necessarily severe enough to warrant bankruptcy. The average
Z-score in our sample is 3.59. ExecuComp database includes only firms in the S&P 1500
index, so it is not surprising that our sample firms are in relatively good financial health.
Our second default risk measure is Ohlson’s O-score developed in Ohlson (1980). This
measure is a weighted average of several accounting variables related to the financial health
of the firm. Using the estimated coefficients from the probit regression in Ohlson (1980) we
calculate O-score for each firm-year in our sample. Lower O-scores indicate that the firm
is less likely to become distressed. Further, we include the nave distance-to-default (DD)
measure and associated expected probability of default (EDF) developed in Bharath and
Shumway (2008). The nave distance-to-default measures the number of standard deviations
that the firm’s asset value can fall before the firm defaults. The expected probability of
default translates the distance-to-default to a probability measure of firm default using a
standard normal distribution.
The final rows of Table 2.1 present various firm and CEO characteristics that are shown
to be correlated with inside debt by prior literature. We define firm size as log of total
assets and firm leverage as the ratio of book value of debt to market value of equity. CEO
leverage is defined as the ratio of CEO inside debt to inside equity and is included for
comparison purposes. R&D is defined as research and development expense scaled by book
value of total assets. The firms in our sample have an average firm size of 7.72 (the total
book assets are $7 billion on average), average firm leverage of 0.5, average CEO leverage
of 0.27, average R&D of 0.02, and average CEO age of 55 years old.
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2.2.2 Summary statistics of subsamples
General principle-agent models with respect to the agency problem between the manager
and debt holders (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976)) suggest that optimal project choice
results in equal proportion of debt and equity incentives (i.e., CEO to firm leverage ratio
equals one). However, the summary statistics indicate that CEO to firm leverage ratio
varies in a much larger range than the theory’s prediction. Edmans and Liu (2011) indicate
that an equity bias (CEO to firm leverage ratio smaller than one) is usually preferred to
induce effort and a debt bias (CEO to firm leverage ratio bigger than one) is preferred when
default risk is higher. We now further investigate the relation between inside debt and firm
characteristics.
Inside debt (CEO to firm leverage ratio) and firms’ default risk (Z-score) are positively
correlated. This indicates that less distressed firms use more inside debt. Further, CEO to
firm leverage ratio is highly skewed. Approximately one quarter of our firm-year observa-
tions have zero CEO to firm leverage ratio and one quarter of our firm-year observations
have zero CEO to firm leverage ratio > 1. To analyze this matter further, we provide
summary statistics for firms with a large debt bias, i.e., firms with CEO to firm leverage
ratio > 5 and firms with CEO to firm leverage ratio ≤ 5. We compare firm and CEO
characteristics across the two groups in Table 2.2. The high CEO to firm leverage ratio
group has significantly lower leverage, more research and development expense, and older
CEO on average. Most importantly for our purposes, the high CEO to firm leverage ratio
group is significantly less likely to become financially distressed based on all four default
risk measures. These results are confirmed in a probit regression framework in Table 2.3.
Similar to the univariate evidence, the high CEO to firm leverage ratio group tends to have
more assets, older CEOs and lower leverage, and most importantly has less default risk.
2.3 Hypothesis development
The traditional wisdom from Jensen and Meckling (1976) indicates that CEO compen-
sation should include not only equity incentives that alleviate the agency problem between
managers and equity holders, but also debt incentives that alleviate the agency problem
between the manager and debt holders. They indicate that CEO to firm leverage ratio
should be one when considering the project selection problem. Edmans and Liu (2011)
take one step further and indicate that CEO to firm leverage ratio of one may not always
be optimal. An equity bias or a debt bias might be needed to address different concerns.
The empirical research has confirmed that in real contracts CEO compensation exhibits
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a balance between debt and equity incentives and inside debt is correlated with less risky
firm policies. Further there is market reaction evidence that disclosure of sizable inside
debt positions leads to increased debt prices and decreased equity prices. At the very least,
CEO to firm leverage ratio varies from 0 to 104. This motivates us to further analyze the
characteristics of the firms with a debt or an equity bias, and whether it is consistent with
the traditional wisdom.
In this chapter, we research whether firms that are likely to face more severe agency
problems of debt actually provide more debt incentives. The project selection problem
suggests that debt incentives are only relevant in firms with risky debt. We follow this
insight and note that inside debt should be driven by the riskiness of debt according to
the agency problem between the manager and debt holders. Further, in the equilibrium
model of Edmans and Liu (2011) in which inside debt is used to provide debt incentives,
an empirical prediction is that firms that are more likely to go bankrupt will provide more
debt incentives. We use the firms’ default risk to proxy for the riskiness of debt and to test
its relation with various measures of inside debt. This leads to our testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: According to the general principal-agent theory, inside debt should be
positively correlated with default risk after controlling for other variables that affect inside
debt.
Hypothesis 2: An exogenous increase in firms’ default risk should lead to an increase in
inside debt usage after controlling for confounding effects.
2.4 Empirical analysis
In this section, we present the empirical analysis testing the relation between inside debt
and the riskiness of debt. We start with analyzing the cross-sectional variation in inside
debt usage. We then use the 2008 financial crisis as an exogenous shift in firm default risk
and shed light on the causal relation between default risk and inside debt.
2.4.1 Cross-sectional variation of inside debt
We analyze the cross-sectional variation of inside debt by conducting panel data regres-
sions of our four variables describing inside debt, on control variables that include default
risk, firm size, firm leverage, research and development expense, and CEO age using all
4,608 firm-year observations in our sample. We include dummy variables for each year to
account for time-fixed effects and our standard errors are clustered by firm to account for
firm-fixed effects.
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For presentation purposes, we only report results using Z-score as the default risk
measure. In Table 2.4, we confirm that firms with more inside debt are likely to be bigger
in size, have less leverage, and have older CEOs, consistent with the prior literature. Refer
to the coefficient on our default risk measure (Z-score), we see that less distressed firms
are more likely to have higher inside debt holdings (CEO Inside debt to cash compensation
ratio), and higher debt incentives (CEO to firm leverage ratio and CEO relative incentive
ratio). This result suggests that firms that face more severe project selection problems and
that could potentially benefit from higher debt incentives, do not use more inside debt or
show a debt bias in CEO incentives.
2.4.2 Changes in inside debt around the 2008 financial crisis
Our strategy to identify the causal relation of default risk on inside debt relies on an
exogenous change in default risk. We use the ongoing global financial crisis as an exogenous
event (i.e., an event beyond the firm’s control) which leads to an exogenous change in default
risk. “The 2008 global financial crisis came to the forefront of the world in September
2008, with the failure and merging of a number of American financial companies.” We
review the timeline of the crisis to determine the crisis period. On 7 September 2008,
two firms, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were declared to be nationalized to ensure their
financial stability. On 14 September 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and Bank
of America announced merger plans with Merrill Lynch. On 16 September 2008, the Federal
Reserve bailed out American International Group (AIG) $85 billion. This is followed by
more failed banks and the stock market crash in both the US and Europe. Given that the
start of the crisis is in the fourth quarter of 2008, for simplicity we refer fiscal year 2008 as
the crisis period. There is a relatively large increase in overall firm default risk measured
by Z-score around fiscal year 2008 that resembles the timeline of the crisis. The financial
crisis originated from the sub-prime mortgage crisis that raised concerns about the financial
stability of the American and European banking industries. The American economy is built
on credit with firms and consumers borrowing money from banks. The shock to the credit
supply around the 2008 financial crisis led to an increase in default risk on average. This
increase in default risk is exogenous to the extent that the other economic fundamentals
(e.g., firm size, research and development expense and CEO age) that have been shown to
be correlated with inside debt usage are largely left intact. We admit that our experiment
still falls short of an ideal experiment because the crisis may also change other unobservable
factors that affect the firm’s need to provide debt incentives. Nevertheless, this change in
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firms’ default risk offers an opportunity to provide evidence on the causal relation between
default risk and inside debt. We apply this exogenous change in default risk to test our
second hypothesis, i.e. whether the increase in default risk leads to an increase in inside
debt. We use a difference-in-differences approach to analyze how CEOs’ inside debt holdings
and debt incentives have changed in response to the 2008 financial crisis.
An ideal experiment to establish a causal relation between default risk and inside debt
is to identify control and treatment groups that are identical in all aspects except that the
treatment group receives the treatment (i.e., change in default risk) while the control group
does not. Despite the overall increase in default risk, we are able to split our full sample
into the control group, 217 firms with decreased default risk from 2007 to 2008, and the
treatment group, 816 firms with increased default risk from 2007 to 2008. We assume that
the control group is not affected by the financial crisis in the sense that they do not become
more distressed.
Before applying the difference-in-differences approach, we test the underlying assump-
tions in this approach. First, we test whether the control group is statistically identical
to the treatment group both in inside debt usage, and in various dimensions that previous
literature has identified as key determinants of inside debt. In Table 2.5 Panel A, we show
various firm and CEO characteristics, and inside debt variables for both the control and
treatment group in the pre-crisis period (i.e., fiscal year 2006 and 2007). With respect to
the level of size, leverage, R&D, CEO age, CEO inside debt to cash compensation ratio,
CEO to firm leverage ratio, and CEO relative incentive ratio, the mean of the control
group is statistically identical to that of the treatment group at 1% significance level. Mean
CEO inside debt holdings of the control group are statistically different from those of the
treatment group at 10% significance level. Second, we do a parallel-trends test of various
inside debt variables in the pre-crisis period. This helps guarantee that our results in the
difference-in-differences test are not driven by trends in the pre-crisis period. As seen in
Table 2.5 Panel B, the changes for all four inside debt variables in the pre-crisis period
are statistically identical across the control and treatment groups. Finally in Table 2.6, our
probit analysis also indicates that the firms in the treatment group are statistically identical
to those in the control group, consistent with the univariate analysis.
After establishing the validity of the control and treatment groups, we apply the difference-
in-differences approach to evaluate how the treatment group responds to the financial crisis
compared to the control group. Firms with higher default risk should have greater needs
to provide debt incentives, all else equal. Hence, the difference in the change of inside
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debt between the treatment and control groups should be positive. However, the empirical
results suggest otherwise. In Table 2.7, we present the raw changes of each inside debt
variable. With respect to CEO to firm leverage ratio, firms in the control group increase
their CEO to firm leverage ratio by 2.39, while firms in the treatment group increase their
CEO to firm leverage ratio by only 0.12. A significant test indicates that the treatment
group increased their CEO to firm leverage ratio significantly less than the control group.
The results for CEO inside debt holdings, CEO inside debt to cash compensation ratio,
and CEO relative incentive ratio are similar, although the difference for CEO inside debt
to cash compensation ratio is not statistically significant.
Last, we do the difference-in-differences test in a regression framework to take firm
heterogeneity into consideration. After including an indicator for the crisis period and an
indicator for the treatment group, the interaction term of the two indicators will capture
the difference-in-differences estimate between the treatment and control group from the
pre-crisis to crisis period. Refer to Table 2.8 column 3, crisis is significantly positive,
indicating an increase of CEO to firm leverage ratio for the control group from the pre-crisis
to the crisis period. It is also worth noting that the coefficient on treatment is statistically
insignificant, i.e., the difference between the treatment and control group in the pre-crisis
period is statistically identical. Most importantly, crisis*treatment is significantly negative
when we research the changes in CEO to firm leverage ratio between the two groups around
the crisis. This indicates that the incentive measure that weights the relative debt to equity
incentives (CEO to firm leverage ratio) for the treatment group increases significantly less
than that of the control group. Intuitively, the treatment group includes those firms that
experience increased agency costs of debt in the crisis period and will benefit from debt
incentive alignment. However, the incentives that the treatment group provides through
inside debt increase significantly less than those of the control group.
In sum, the analyses in Table 2.7 and 2.8 do not generally support the conventional
wisdom that more distressed firms use more debt incentives to alleviate the agency costs
of debt. The mechanism indicates that inside debt helps align managerial incentives with
those of debt holders. However, the empirical evidence of less distress firms using more
debt incentives suggests that providing debt incentives does not appear to be first order
determinant for inside debt usage. In the next section, we decompose the incentive measure
and show that firms appear to let this ratio drift without actively managing them in the
direction of providing incentives.
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2.5 Decomposing the incentive measure
The two debt incentive measures contain a lot of moving parts. To understand which
components contribute to the results in Section 2.4.2, we decompose the incentive measures
into their underlying parts. First, we briefly describe the institutional details of both pension
and deferred compensation using information from the firm’s proxy statement. Second, we
examine the real data in light of these institutional details. This exercise helps to uncover
the contributing factors for the results presented in Section 2.4.2.
2.5.1 Institutional details for pension and deferred compensation
In our sample, 43% of the firm year observations have non-zero outstanding pension
liabilities. CEO pension plans are typically defined benefit plans, in which CEOs will
receive a pre-determined amount per year after leaving the company. The outstanding
pension liability is usually calculated as the present value of a surviving annuity starting
from the firm’s designated retirement age. The annual amount for the annuity usually
depends on both the CEO’s recent cash compensation level (including both salary and
bonus, usually the past three years) and the number of years served in the company. This
amount is usually disclosed in the firm’s proxy statement. The outstanding pension balance
is usually available to CEOs either in a lump sum or an annuity. If CEOs leave the company
before this age, there will typically be adjustment made to the outstanding pension balance.
For example, usually the terms of the pension agreement will attach a penalty to the
outstanding pension balance if the CEO departs from the company before the specified
retirement age. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) among others introduce the formula that
firms use to calculate the outstanding pension balance. They note that the annual amount
is around 60% of the average pay received in their final years in office. In 2007 the SEC
required all firms to disclose the present value of pension liabilities. The expected annual
annuity payments are typically calculated by multiplying the annual annuity payment each
year by the probability that CEO will be alive in that year. The expected annuity payments
are then discounted at the firm’s at a rate commensurate with the risk of the cash flows to
arrive at a present value of pension liabilities. For example, Sundaram and Yermack (2007)
use the rate on the firm’s long-term debt.
Several factors may contribute to the year-over-year changes to pension liabilities. 1)
The annuity payments will increase as CEO cash compensation and years served in the
company increase. Usually changes to CEO cash compensation are positive, thus these two
components typically result in increases in annuity payments. 2) Firms may change the
discount rate used to value pension liabilities according to changes in the riskiness of the
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annuity cash flows. 3) CEOs may withdraw funds from their pension accounts. Withdrawals
typically occur when CEOs retire or reach the defined retirement age. 4) From time to time,
firms may restructure their pension plans resulting in withdrawals. 5) CEO turnover will
result in the settlement of the old CEO’s pension liabilities.
In our sample, approximately 10% of our sample firms have negative changes to pension
liabilities from 2007 to 2008. For the control (treatment) group approximately 7% (11%)
firms have negative changes to pension liabilities, 47% (43%) of the negative changes are
due to CEO turnover.
In our sample, 33% of the CEOs have deferred compensation plans. Firms usually allow
CEOs to defer part of their cash compensation (cash or cash bonus) or equity incentive
compensation for a pre-determined period of time. Earlier withdrawal will result in a
penalty. Usually firms will match the amount that CEO chooses to defer and there is a cap
over the deferred amount. Deferred compensation is typically indexed to a mutual fund or
a specific rate. In this sense, their market value fluctuates every year along with the overall
market condition. Each year, there might be deferred compensation from early years that
becomes available and can be withdrawn. This leads to the fact that deferred compensation
can decrease significantly from year to year despite the fact that CEOs might accumulate
new deferred compensation each year. In our data, the decrease in inside debt appears to
be driven by the decrease in deferred compensation.
2.5.2 Decomposing the incentive measure around the crisis period
In this section, we decompose the incentive measure into its underlying components and
try to unravel the mechanisms that drive the results around the crisis period using the
institutional details in Section 2.5.1. As our incentive measures CEO to firm leverage ratio
and CEO relative incentive ratio are correlated with coefficient of 0.99, we focus only on
CEO to firm leverage ratio. CEO to firm leverage ratio can be interpreted as debt to equity
pay performance sensitivity. Empirically, debt pay performance sensitivity is calculated as
the ratio of inside debt value to face value of debt. Equity pay performance sensitivity is
calculated as the ratio of inside equity value to market value of equity. Debt pay performance
sensitivity is on average 0.03 and equity pay performance sensitivity is on average 0.02 in
our full sample. This indicates that CEO wealth will increase by 0.03(0.02) dollars if he
increases firm debt (equity) value by one dollar.
Refer to Table 2.9, we decompose the variable CEO to firm leverage ratio into its
underlying components, and show the changes for each individual variable around the
crisis period. Overall, CEO to firm leverage ratio increases by 2.67 (0.07) for the control
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(treatment) group. First, we investigate whether the difference in changes for the control and
treatment group comes from the difference in changes for debt or equity pay performance
sensitivity, or both. For the control (treatment) group, debt pay performance sensitivity
changes by 0.0142 (-0.0043) and equity pay performance sensitivity changes by -0.0033
(-0.0028) on average. This results in an overall larger increase of CEO to firm leverage
ratio for the control group than the treatment group. It appears that the main difference
between the changes in CEO to firm leverage ratio for the control and treatment groups is
attributed to the changes in debt pay performance sensitivity. Next, we investigate which
underlying variables drive the changes in debt pay performance sensitivity. We tabulate
both the inside debt and firm debt in Table 2.8 Panel B. For the control (treatment) group,
inside debt changes by $-0.05 ($-0.69) million and firm debt changes by $-59.3 ($219.1)
million. This indicates that the main difference between the control and treatment groups
with respect to the debt pay performance sensitivity comes from both a numerator and
denominator effect.
Inside debt (the numerator) decreases for the treatment group but increases for the
control group. Firm debt (the denominator) increases more for the treatment group than
for the control group. These two effects around the crisis period together contribute to the
findings in Section 2.4.2. This exercise also helps to point out that firms do not appear to
actively manage the incentive ratio. Based on results in Section 2.4 and 2.5, we conjecture
that providing debt incentives may not be first order determinant for firms’ use of inside
debt.
2.6 Conclusion
The classical principal-agent theory indicates that CEO compensation should include
both equity incentives to induce effort and debt incentives to alleviate the agency costs
of debt. The empirical evidence has been mostly indirect tests of this insight. Prior
research shows that CEO compensation exhibits a balance between debt incentives and
equity incentives. Inside debt has been shown to be correlated with less risky firm policies.
Further there is market reaction evidence that disclosure of sizable inside debt leads to an
increase in debt value.
In this chapter, we directly test whether the observed contracts are consistent with
the theoretical prediction. The classical principal-agent theory indicates that the agency
problem between the manager and debt holders is linked to the riskiness of debt. Specifically,
the project selection problem is only an issue when the firm’s debt is risky. The severity of
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the problem should be directly related to the riskiness of debt. We provide direct evidence
on firms’ rationale of inside debt by exploiting this largely ignored insight.
Contrary to the above conjecture, we show that firms with less default risk use more
inside debt. This means that more distressed firms (i.e., those firms with severe agency
problems between debt holders and equity holders) are less likely to use inside debt. On
the contrary, healthier firms, where the project selection problem is less of a problem, tend
to use more inside debt. Further, we analyze whether this relation is causal by exploiting
the 2008 financial crisisan exogenous shift in default risk. Using a difference-in-differences
approach, we find that firms with increased default risk over the crisis period increase their
inside debt significantly less than those firms with increased default risk. In summary, we
provide evidence that firms’ default risk has a causal effect on inside debt. However, the
relation is inconsistent with the agency theory’s prediction.
This chapter builds on both the theoretical framework of agency theory and related
empirical research of inside debt. Our results suggest that traditional contracting theories
do not appear to be first-order determinants of inside debt. Although it is beyond this
chapter’s scope to explore why less distressed firms use more inside debt, we conjecture
that personal tax considerations appear to be an important driver of inside debt. Further
research is required to fully reveal the mystery of inside debt.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of the inside debt sample.
This table contains summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis over the full
sample period. Our sample consists of 4,607 firm-year observations from fiscal years 2006
to 2010.
variable N Mean sd q1 median q3
Compensation components
Pension 4607 2.96 7.01 0.00 0.00 2.57
Deferred compensation 4607 2.54 8.10 0.00 0.20 1.72
Cash compensation 4607 1.11 2.22 0.63 0.86 1.11
Stock option 4607 15.52 33.44 1.64 6.14 16.53
Stock holding 4607 92.79 1022 2.38 7.30 20.55
Inside debt variables
CEO inside debt holding 4607 5.50 12.31 0.00 0.95 5.57
CEO inside debt/cashcomp 4607 4.67 8.58 0.00 1.13 5.82
CEO to firm leverage ratio 4607 3.24 15.86 0.00 0.24 1.32
market relative debt ratio 2350 1.36 2.79 0.01 0.34 1.35
CEO incentive ratio 4607 2.37 11.12 0.00 0.19 0.97
CEO equity incentives 4607 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02
CEO debt incentives 4607 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.01
Default risk measures
Z-score 4607 3.54 3.30 2.11 3.14 4.61
O-score 4604 -1.82 1.87 -2.91 -1.88 -0.85
DD 4456 6.31 5.43 2.70 5.35 8.52
EDF 4456 0.07 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
Firm and CEO characteristics
Firm assets 4607 7603 20559 784.5 2024 5876
Firm size 4607 7.72 1.49 6.67 7.61 8.68
Debt-to-equity 4607 0.69 4.51 0.09 0.23 0.49
Market Debt-to-equity 2350 0.65 2.52 0.16 0.30 0.56
Market value of debt 2350 3165 6331 452.3 1207 3165
Book leverage 4607 0.25 0.17 0.12 0.23 0.34
Market leverage 4607 0.23 0.20 0.08 0.19 0.33
Profitability 4602 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.18
Tangibility 4602 0.28 0.23 0.10 0.20 0.40
Market-to-book 4607 1.41 0.88 0.83 1.17 1.71
CEO leverage 4607 0.28 0.70 0.00 0.06 0.30
R&D 4607 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03
CEO age 4607 55.44 7.01 51.00 55.00 60.00
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics across sub-samples: the group of firms with CEO to firm
leverage ratio > 5 and the group of firms with CEO to firm leverage ratio <= 5.
This table splits the full sample into two groups. The mean and standard deviation (in
parentheses) are reported. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels are signified with ***,
**, and *, respectively.
CEO to firm CEO to firm
Variable leverage ratio <= 5 leverage ratio > 5 p-value
Inside debt variables
CEO inside debt holding 4.61 14.47 0.00***
(10.40) (22.39)
CEO inside debt/cashcomp 3.97 11.70 0.00***
(7.62) (13.29)
CEO to firm leverage ratio 0.65 29.39 0.00***
(1.02) (45.12)
Market relative leverage 0.74 9.64 0.00***
(1.04) (4.94)
CEO incentive ratio 0.48 21.49 0.00***
(0.75) (31.08)
Default risk measures
Z-score 3.35 5.45 0.00***
(3.25) (3.15)
O-score -1.71 -3.02 0.00***
(1.84) (1.82)
DD 5.80 11.56 0.00***
(4.84) (7.76)
EDF 0.07 0.01 0.00***
(0.20) (0.08)
Firm and CEO characteristics
Firm size 7.70 7.86 0.07*
(1.46) (1.69)
Debt-to-equity 0.75 0.11 0.00***
(4.72) (0.32)
Market Debt-to-equity 0.68 0.15 0.00***
(2.61) (0.13)
Market debt 3053 4659 0.05*
(5909) (10378)
R&D 0.03 0.03 0.10
(0.05) (0.05)
CEO age 55.27 57.21 0.00***
(7.05) (6.34)
Book leverage 0.26 0.10 0.00***
(0.17) (0.11)
Market leverage 0.25 0.08 0.00***
(0.20) (0.10)
Profitability 0.14 0.17 0.00***
(0.08) (0.09)
Tangibility 0.28 0.25 0.00***
(0.23) (0.18)
Market-to-book 1.38 1.71 0.00***
(0.86) (1.01)
No. obs. 4192 415
No. obs. (o-score) 4189 415
No. obs. (dd) 4058 398
No. obs. (edf) 4058 398
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Table 2.3: Probit analysis of the group of firms with greater than five CEO to firm leverage
ratio.
This table presents a probit regression across all firm-years where the dependent variable
is equal to one if the CEO to firm leverage ratio for the firm-year is greater than five;
otherwise, the dependent variable is equal to zero. All independent variables are defined
in Appendix. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10%
levels are signified with ***, **, and *, respectively. Due to extremely high correlation
(0.8) between Firm leverage and EDF, we do not include Firm leverage as an independent
variable in model (4).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO to firm leverage ratio > 5
Firm size 0.08∗∗ 0.04 0.04 0.03
(2.35) (1.08) (1.24) (0.79)
Firm leverage -1.39 -1.39 -0.86
(-1.60) (-1.50) (-1.46)
R&D -0.02 0.13 -0.08 1.02
(-0.02) (0.15) (-0.10) (1.48)
CEO age 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗









Constant -3.30∗∗∗ -2.86∗∗∗ -3.27∗∗∗ -2.82∗∗∗
(-6.84) (-7.00) (-7.96) (-6.78)
No. Obs 4607 4604 4456 4456
pseudo R2 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.04
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 2.4: Panel regressions describing cross sectional variation of inside debt and firms’
default risk.
This table contains the results from panel regressions on the full sample of 4,607 firm-year
observations. The dependent variable is one of our measures of inside debt (CEO Inside
debt holdings, CEO Inside debt to cash compensation ratio, CEO to firm leverage ratio, or
CEO relative incentive ratio). Dummy variables for each fiscal year in the sample are also
included in the regression. Firm leverage is excluded from regression (3) and (4) as it is
the denominator of CEO to firm leverage ratio and highly correlated with the denominator
of CEO relative incentive ratio. The table reports t-statistics based on standard errors
clustered at the firm level in parentheses. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels are
signified with ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO inside CEO inside debt/ CEO to firm CEO relative
debt holdings cash compensation leverage ratio incentive ratio
Z-score 0.16∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(2.12) (2.48) (3.48) (3.49)
Firm size 3.79∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗ -0.25 -0.32∗
(9.91) (10.25) (-0.91) (-1.65)
Firm leverage -0.06∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗
(-2.99) (-2.89)
R&D 8.19∗ 0.91 11.68∗ 6.53
(1.89) (0.33) (1.78) (1.36)
CEO age 0.22∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.09∗∗
(6.24) (5.62) (2.21) (2.45)
Constant -36.71∗∗∗ -20.84∗∗∗ -3.83 -2.19
(-9.52) (-9.10) (-0.95) (-0.77)
No. Obs. 4607 4607 4607 4607
Adj. R2 0.23 0.16 0.02 0.02
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
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Table 2.5: Tests of the control and treatment group in the pre-crisis period.
The table presents the results that compare the control and treatment groups in the pre-
crisis period. We have 2066 firm-year observations for fiscal years 2006 and 2007. The
control group is composed of those firms with increased default risk during the 2008 financial
crisis. The treatment group is composed of those firms with decreased default risk during
the 2008 financial crisis. The change in firms’ default risk during the 2008 financial crisis
is measured by the change in the firm’s Z-score from fiscal year 2007 to 2008. Panel A
presents the mean and standard deviation, in parentheses, of each group’s CEO and inside
debt variables in the pre-crisis period. Panel B presents the results of changes in each inside
debt variable, i.e., the parallel trends test. P-values associated with t-tests for different
means between groups are also reported. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels are
signified with ***, **, and *, respectively.
Panel A: Pre-Crisis (2006 and 2007) Control Treatment
group group p-value
Firm size 7.55 7.61 0.46
(1.52) (1.48)
Debt-to-equity 0.38 0.34 0.13
(0.57) (0.67)
R&D 0.02 0.02 0.07*
(0.04) (0.05)
CEO age 55.32 54.91 0.29
(7.12) (7.13)
CEO inside debt holdings 4.29 5.23 0.09*
(9.67) (12.16)
CEO inside debt/cash comp. 4.11 4.26 0.70
(7.08) (7.52)
CEO to firm leverage ratio 3.01 5.21 0.35
(15.84) (90.08)
CEO incentive ratio 1.89 1.87 0.95
(7.40) (6.45)
No. obs. 434 1632
Panel B: growth rate (2006− 2007)
CEO inside debt holdings 0.23 0.28 0.87
(2.50) (6.70)
CEO inside debt/cash comp. 0.10 0.20 0.60
(2.10) (3.46)
CEO to firm leverage ratio -1.25 -5.19 0.38
(14.40) (124.0)
CEO incentive ratio -0.26 0.09 0.22
(3.75) (3.55)
No. obs. 217 816
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Table 2.6: Tests of the control and treatment group in the pre-crisis period.
The table presents the results that compare the control and treatment groups in the pre-
crisis period. We have 2066 firm-year observations for fiscal years 2006 and 2007. The
control group is composed of those firms with increased default risk during the 2008 financial
crisis. The treatment group is composed of those firms with decreased default risk during
the 2008 financial crisis. The change in firms’ default risk during the 2008 financial crisis
is measured by the change in the firm’s Z-score from fiscal year 2007 to 2008. We present
the results of probit regressions using data in the pre-crisis period. The dependent variable
is a dummy variable treatment that equals one if the firm belongs to the treatment group
and zero otherwise. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1, 5, and
10% levels are signified with ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment
Firm size 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.27) (0.90) (1.06) (1.06)
Firm leverage -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(-1.18) (-1.31) (-1.31) (-1.33)
R&D 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.16
(1.57) (1.57) (1.58) (1.56)
CEO age -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(-1.34) (-1.14) (-1.12) (-1.12)
CEO inside debt holdings 0.00
(1.41)
CEO inside debt to 0.00
cash compensation ratio (0.19)
CEO to firm leverage ratio 0.00
(0.48)
CEO relative incentive ratio -0.00
(-0.08)
Constant 1.06∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗
(3.51) (3.13) (3.21) (3.22)
No. Obs. 2066 2066 2066 2066
pseudo R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
p-value 0.13 0.26 0.23 0.26
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Table 2.7: Difference-in-differences mean tests of inside debt across the control and
treatment groups.
Difference-in-differences mean tests of inside debt across the control and treatment groups.
This table presents the results of difference-in-differences tests of the means of various inside
debt variables surrounding the 2008 financial crisis. The control group is composed of those
firms with increased default risk during the 2008 financial crisis. The treatment group is
composed of those firms with decreased default risk during the 2008 financial crisis. The
change in firms’ default risk during the 2008 financial crisis is measured by the change in
the firm’s Z-score from fiscal year 2007 to 2008. We calculate each firm’s change of the
inside debt measures over the crisis period (the change from fiscal year 2007 to 2008). We
then report each group’s mean change during the crisis period with standard deviations in
parentheses. The difference-differences are calculated by subtracting the mean change of
the control group from that of the treatment group. P-values associated with t-tests for
different means between groups are also reported. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels
are signified with ***, **, and *, respectively.
Control Treatment Difference-
Raw change (2008− 2007) group group in-differences p-value
CEO inside debt holdings -0.05 -0.69 -0.64 0.07*
(4.14) (6.15)
CEO inside debt\cash compensation -0.25 -0.46 -0.21 0.50
(4.23) (3.62)
CEO to firm leverage ratio 2.67 0.07 -2.60 0.03**
(16.26) (9.93)
CEO relative incentive ratio 1.93 0.00 -1.93 0.02**
(12.01) (7.22)
No. Obs. 217 816
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Table 2.8: Difference-in-differences mean tests of inside debt across the control and
treatment groups.
Difference-in-differences mean tests of inside debt across the control and treatment groups.
This table reports the results from the difference-in-differences regressions. The sample
includes 217 firms in the control group and 816 firms in the treatment group, a total of
2,066 firm-year observations in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Crisis is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one for fiscal year 2008 and zero for fiscal year 2007. Treatment
is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm belongs to the treatment group and zero
otherwise. Firm leverage is excluded from regression (3) and (4) as it’s the denominator
of CEO to firm leverage ratio and highly correlated with the denominator of CEO relative
incentive ratio. The control group is composed of those firms with increased default risk
during the 2008 financial crisis. The treatment group is composed of those firms with
decreased default risk during the 2008 financial crisis. The change in firms’ default risk
during the 2008 financial crisis is measured by the change in the firm’s Z-score from fiscal
year 2007 to 2008. The table reports t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the
firm level in parentheses. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels are signified with ***, **,
and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO inside CEO inside debt/ CEO to firm CEO relative
debt holdings cash compensation leverage ratio incentive ratio
Crisis 0.05 -0.18 2.62∗∗ 1.90∗∗
(0.18) (-0.65) (2.40) (2.35)
Treatment 0.83 0.15 0.21 0.16
(1.20) (0.30) (0.28) (0.29)
Crisis ∗ treatment -0.75∗∗ -0.27 -2.63∗∗ -1.95∗∗
(-2.15) (-0.88) (-2.28) (-2.29)
Firm size 3.34∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗ -0.19 -0.29
(9.94) (10.79) (-0.73) (-1.60)
Firm leverage -0.06∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(-3.53) (-3.54)
R&D 6.63∗ 0.24 12.74 7.61
(1.89) (0.12) (1.53) (1.26)
CEO age 0.19∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(5.44) (5.17) (2.45) (2.70)
Constant -31.51∗∗∗ -16.94∗∗∗ -3.29 -1.92
(-9.22) (-8.79) (-1.13) (-0.93)
No. Obs. 2066 2066 2066 2066
adjusted R2 0.23 0.17 0.01 0.01
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.06
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Table 2.9: Difference-in-differences components of inside debt.
Difference-in-differences mean tests of inside debt across the control and treatment groups.
This table reports the results from the difference-in-differences regressions. The sample
includes 217 firms in the control group and 816 firms in the treatment group, a total of
2,066 firm-year observations in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Crisis is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one for fiscal year 2008 and zero for fiscal year 2007. Treatment
is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm belongs to the treatment group and zero
otherwise. Firm leverage is excluded from regression (3) and (4) as it’s the denominator
of CEO to firm leverage ratio and highly correlated with the denominator of CEO relative
incentive ratio. The control group is composed of those firms with increased default risk
during the 2008 financial crisis. The treatment group is composed of those firms with
decreased default risk during the 2008 financial crisis. The change in firms’ default risk
during the 2008 financial crisis is measured by the change in the firm’s Z-score from fiscal
year 2007 to 2008. The table reports t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the
firm level in parentheses. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels are signified with ***, **,
and *, respectively.
Control Treatment Difference-
Equity (2008− 2007) group group in-differences p-value
CEO equity -0.33 -0.28 0.05 0.83
performance sensitivity ∗100 (3.64) (2.19)
CEO equity -17.6 -62.7 -45.1 0.00***
(136.4) (368.6)
Firm equity -1720 -3242 -1522 0.03**
(9532) (8431)
Stock option -5.98 -10.4 -4.42 0.01***
(20.82) (23.55)
Stock holding -11.6 -52.3 -40.7 0.01***
(131.8) (364.7)
Debt (2008− 2007)
CEO debt pay 1.42 -0.43 -1.85 0.01**
performance sensitivity ∗100 (10.41) (7.63)
CEO inside debt holdings -0.05 -0.69 -0.64 0.07*
(4.14) (6.15)
Firm debt -59.3 219.1 278.4 0.00***
(590.9) (1146)
Pension 0.20 0.08 -0.12 0.54
(2.83) (2.51)
Defered compensation -0.25 -0.76 -0.51 0.04**
(2.56) (5.37)
Deferred Compensation 2008
CEO contributions 255.2 243.1 -12.1 0.84
(757.0) (877.3)
Firm contributions 67.37 109.6 42.23 0.20
(200.4) (859.2)
Earnings -350 -427 -77.0 0.63
(2189) (1648)
Withdrawal 26.53 210.7 184.2 0.01***
(188.5) (1966)
No. Obs. 217 816
CHAPTER 3
THE ROLE OF INSIDE DEBT IN THE
OPTIMAL STRUCTURE OF CEO PAY
Merton (1974) models the equity of the firm as a call option on the underlying asset of
the firm with the strike price equal to the face value of the firm’s debt. In this chapter,
we adopt the Merton framework to analyze the firm’s rationale for inside debt. Given the
observed magnitudes of equity incentives and debt incentives in chief executive officer (CEO)
compensation, we first characterize the set of positive net present value (NPV) projects that
CEO prefer to forego (underinvestment) and the set of negative NPV projects that CEO
want to accept (overinvestment). The magnitudes of underinvestment and overinvestment
problems appear to be small on average in the sample. The observed magnitudes of inside
debt are hard to reconcile with the hypothesis that providing debt incentives is the main
reason for inside debt. Finally, the savings from deferral of personal tax appear to moderate
in magnitude.
3.1 Introduction
Investment distortions arising from the conflict between debt holders and equity hold-
ers have been one major argument explaining the role of inside debt in firms’ optimal
contracting with managers. This chapter uses numerical methods to quantify investment
distortions in a setup that takes managerial incentives into consideration. We analyze the
project selection problem in which the manager makes investment decisions conditional on
both equity and debt incentives in his contract. Quantifying the magnitudes of investment
distortions is important to understand their relative importance in optimal contracting with
managers.
“Inside debt” refers to the part of executive pay with payoffs similar to the debt security
held by external creditors. It usually includes both pension and deferred compensation.
Similarly, “inside equity” refers to the part of executive pay with payoffs similar to the
equity security held by external investors. It usually includes both stock options and stock
54
holdings. Theoretically, Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that inside debt exposes chief
executive officers (CEOs) to default risk as inside debt represents unsecured and unfunded
liabilities of the firm. Hence, inside debt helps align managerial incentives with those of debt
holders. Consistent with this view, there has been empirical evidence showing that firms
with more debt incentives provided through inside debt adopt less risky firm investment
and financing policies and exhibit higher debt ratings (Cassell et al. (2012) among others).
To the extent that inside debt helps align managerial incentives with those of debt hold-
ers through the channel of affecting project selection decisions, it is important to understand
the magnitudes of investment distortions associated with project selection problems. In this
chapter, we research how the combination of debt and equity incentives affects investment
decisions and quantify the magnitudes of investment distortions. One related work is Parrino
and Weisbach (1999). They use discounted cash flow techniques to research the magnitudes
of investment distortions when investment decisions are made to maximize equity value.
They show that the magnitudes of the distortions cannot explain the cross section variation
of firm’s capital structure.
When investment decisions are made to maximize CEO wealth, it is straightforward
that more debt incentives than equity incentives (a debt bias) induce more conservative
investment decisions. And more equity incentives than debt incentives (an equity bias)
induce more risky investment decisions. To measure debt and equity incentives, we follow
the literature and use debt and equity pay-performance sensitivity. Debt or equity pay-
performance sensitivity is defined as the change in the CEO’s wealth when the firm’s debt
or equity value increases by one dollar. When debt and equity pay-performance sensitivity
are not equal, there will be investment distortions as investment decisions are no longer
made to maximize firm value. Empirically, debt pay-performance sensitivity is calculated
as the ratio of inside debt value to face value of debt. Equity pay-performance sensitivity
is calculated as the ratio of inside equity value to market value of equity. To evaluate
the effect of investment opportunities on equity and debt holders, we need a framework to
value market value of equity and debt. Current market value of equity is available from the
Compustat database and we adopt the Merton (1974) framework to value the current value
of risky debt. The model assumes that the firm has one zero-coupon bond. Firm equity
can be viewed as a call option on the firm’s asset and the risky debt can be viewed as a
risk-free bond coupled with selling a put option on the firms asset. The strike price for both
options is the face value of the firm’s debt, and the expiration date is the same as the term
of debt. Merton (1974) provides formulas to derive current firm value (equity plus risky
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debt value) and firm volatility from current equity value and equity volatility. Starting from
the current value, when we consider investment opportunities that will affect firm value and
firm volatility, we can value new equity and debt value by black-scholes option formula.
First, we construct a hypothetical firm with mean values in our sample for firm specific
variables, such as face value of debt, market value of equity and equity volatility. We
evaluate the magnitudes of underinvestment and overinvestment problems when the ratio
of debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity varies in the range of zero to ten. This exercise
helps provide a benchmark for the magnitudes of project selection problems that firms face
when the CEO compensation exhibits either a debt or equity bias. Assuming that the
project can increase or decrease the firm volatility by 10 or 20% from its current level, we
show that the negative (positive) NPV projects that CEO will take (forego) vary from 0.01
to 1% of the underlying asset value on average. Despite the variation, it appears that the
project selection problem is reasonably small in magnitude for a typical large United States
firm. This is not surprising as the sample firm equity is deep in the money for the level of
debt outstanding.
Next, we apply this methodology to each individual firm and evaluate the magni-
tudes of underinvestment and overinvestment problems with observed debt and equity pay-
performance sensitivity. Specifically, we take a specific firm’s face value of debt, market value
of equity and equity volatility into consideration and assume that the project can change
the asset volatility by 10 to 90% from its current level. The magnitudes of underinvestment
and overinvestment problems vary up to 4% of the underlying asset value.
Also, we consider a potential friction that might underestimate investment distortions: if
the renegotiation costs prevent the firm from changing the contract constantly, the incentive
contracts may be set optimally to firm parameters later. Further, the level of investment
distortions are calculated when the manager makes a single investment decision, based on
current parameters. The current results might be less relevant to the results to real world
firms which make a series of investment decisions over time, based on parameters (e.g.,
firm value) that will only become known later. We evaluate investment distortions for
possible firm value in one year and calculate the mean investment distortions according to
the distribution of firm value in one year, keeping other parameters unchanged. For the
firms in our sample, we provide summary statistics for the mean investment distortions in
one year. Overall the mean magnitudes of investment distortions are up to 0.5% of asset
value on average in one year.
This chapter is related to the literature examining the relation between CEO compen-
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sation (managerial compensation) and firm investment policies. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen
(2006) among others show that risk taking incentives in CEO compensation are positively
correlated with the riskiness of firm policies. Most work in this literature has focused on
only equity incentives until recently. Cassell et al. (2012) among others show that debt
incentives are positively correlated with less risky investment and financial policies. We
quantify the magnitudes of investment distortions that debt incentives are used to alleviate.
Overall, the magnitudes of underinvestment and overinvestment problems are small under
the assumptions of Merton (1974) for the set of firms in S&P 1500.
The contribution is threefold. First, we take managerial incentives into consideration
when evaluating investment distortions arising from the conflict between debt holders and
equity holders. Second, this simulation exercises contribute to the debate regarding firms’
rationale for using inside debt. Inside debt has been documented to help alleviate agency
costs of debt. This exercise directly quantifies the agency costs that are supposed to be
alleviated by inside debt and indicates that investment distortions are minimal. This result
challenges the conventional wisdom that the literature of debt incentives is built on. Though
admittedly, the small magnitudes of investment distortions may result from the assumptions
in Merton (1974). Finally, we extend the implications of this experiment to the under-
leverage puzzle. Agency costs of debt have been referred as one possible explanation for
the under-leverage puzzle. Consistent with Parrino and Weisbach (1999), this simulation
exercise shows that this cost appears to be small compared to tax benefits. It is also
puzzling that firms do not use more debt if project selection related costs can be eliminated
by providing debt incentives. This at least indicates that other frictions than investment
distortions are responsible for the under leverage puzzle.
3.2 Setup for the simulation
In general researchers separately studied the agency problem between managers and
equity holders (effort choice problem), and the conflict between debt holders and equity
holders (project selection problem). For the agency problem between managers and equity
holders, researchers usually consider a setup with a risk-averse manager, risk-neutral equity
holders and an all equity firm where equity holders are maximizing firm value (i.e., equity
value in this setup). Two types of incentives are researched. First, in order for the manager
to act in interests of the firm (equity holders for an all equity firm), part of the manager’s
compensation is linked to the payoff of equity. For example, restricted stocks and stock
options are common in CEO compensation. Second, with risky payoff in compensation,
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risk-averse CEO may pass up positive net-present-value (i.e., firm value increasing) but
risk increasing projects. Hence, certain convex payoff compensation is granted to promote
risk-seeking behavior. For example, researchers have argued that stock options are part of
the optimal compensation package because they help to induce risk-taking behavior.
On the other hand, the conflict between debt holders and equity holders is usually
researched in a setup with both risk-neutral equity holders and debt holders. Optimal
compensation is derived when firms face two projects, one safe and one risky. John and John
(1993) derive the relation between debt incentives and equity incentives when the project
has discrete payoffs. The underlying intuition for optimal project choice is to ultimately let
the compensation include a proportion of firm value, i.e., the manager is maximizing firm
value as opposed to equity value to alleviate the conflict between debt holders and equity
holders. This statement holds as long as the manager only cares about his wealth.
Edmans and Liu (2011) show that granting the manager equal proportions of debt and
equity incentives may not always be optimal. An equity bias is desired to induce effort for
most situations. However, when bankruptcy is likely or the manager is efficient in increasing
bankruptcy value, a debt bias is preferred. Edmans and Liu (2011) help lay out the intuition
of the interplay between effort choice problem and project selection problem. The intuition
is that the relative efficiency for the manager to increase solvency and bankruptcy value
and the project selection problem are simultaneously evaluated in equilibrium.
To research whether the observed incentive contracts can be justified by a principal
agent model, the technical challenge is to model both the effort choice problem and the
project selection problem in a tractable form with parameters that can be estimated from
data. Further, specific firm level assumptions need to be made about the possible project
choices. In this chapter, we take a different approach and ask the research question of how
large the distortion is when the debt and equity incentives in CEO compensation are not
equal.
We use the framework of Merton (1974) to quantify the distortion when the debt and
equity incentives in CEO compensation are not equal. In this framework, the equity of the
firm is a call option on the underlying value of the firm and the strike price is the face
value of the firm’s debt. There are two main assumptions. The model assumes that the
underlying value of each firm follows geometric Brownian motion and each firm issued only
one zero-coupon bond. Further, neither the underlying value of the firm nor its volatility is
directly observable. Under the model’s assumptions both can be inferred from the value of
equity, the volatility of equity, the face value of debt, and the expiration date of debt.
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After getting the value and the volatility of the firm, we start the simulation process.
The firm’s equity is a call option on the underlying value of the firm, and the firm’s risky
debt is a risk-free bond together with selling a put option on the underlying value of the
firm. The call and put option have the same maturity of the risk-free bond. Consider
a CEO’s compensation exhibiting a debt bias, i.e., the debt pay-performance sensitivity
is larger than equity pay-performance sensitivity. With a decrease in firm volatility all
else equal, the CEO’s compensation is higher. This indicates that the CEO with a debt
bias in his compensation will accept zero NPV but risk decreasing projects. With similar
reasoning, the CEO will accept negative NPV but risk decreasing projects. The cutoff value
for the type of negative NPV but risk decreasing projects is calculated when the firm’s asset
decreases to the point where the CEO’s compensation is the same as that under the original
firm volatility. With an increase in firm volatility all else equal, the CEO’s compensation
is higher. This indicates that the CEO with a debt bias in his compensation will reject
zero NPV but risk increasing projects. With similar reasoning, the CEO will reject positive
NPV but risk increasing projects. The cutoff value for the type of positive NPV but risk
increasing projects is calculated when the firm’s asset increases to the point where the CEO’s
compensation is the same as that under the original firm volatility. Similar reasoning can be
applied to a CEO’s compensation exhibiting an equity bias. The cutoff value for the type
of negative NPV but risk increasing projects is calculated when the firm’s asset decreases
to the point where the CEO’s compensation is the same as that under the original firm
volatility. The cutoff value for the type of positive NPV but risk increasing projects is
calculated when the firm’s asset increases to the point where the CEO’s compensation is
the same as that under the original firm volatility.
3.3 The sample for simulation
As described in Section 3.2, we need various firm and CEO level variables to evaluate
the CEO’s project selection problem under the setup of Merton (1974) model. We start
by collecting the debt and equity incentive components in CEO compensation from the
ExecuComp Database. Inside debt includes pension and deferred compensation and inside
equity includes stock options and stock holdings. Because ExecuComp starts to report
complete information on inside debt holdings from 2006 onward, we restrict my sample
period to fiscal years 2006 through 2011. In addition, we remove firms in the financial
(firms with SIC code between 6000 and 6999) and utility (firms with SIC code between
4900 and 4999) industries. We require all firm-year observations have non-missing data
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for the main inputs to the Merton model, including firm debt and equity, inside debt and
equity, and firm equity volatility. Finally, we exclude firm-years with zero equity incentive
compensation as we use debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity to categorize firms into
subcategories with either a debt or an equity bias. This results in a final sample of 5,447
firm-year observations. All ratio variables are winsorized at the upper 1 percentile to avoid
data errors and outliers. We do not winsorize the ratio variables at the lower 1 percentile
as they are truncated at zero.
In Table 3.1 Panel A, we present summary statistics for the full sample including 5,447
firm-year observations. We start by presenting firm level variables that serve as inputs into
the Merton model. The average firm debt is $1772 million and the average firm equity is
$7632 million. The median firm debt is $436 million and the median firm equity is $1753
million. The firm equity’s annual volatility is 42% on average, and the median is 37%. The
firm’s market leverage is 0.52 on average, and the median is 0.224. It is worth noting that
these firm level variables are highly skewed. We continue to provide summary statistics for
CEO variables. The average CEO’s inside debt holdings are $5 million, and the average
CEO’s inside equity holdings are $57 million. These two variables are highly skewed also.
The median inside debt is $0.7 million and the median inside equity is $16 million. Further,
debt pay-performance sensitivity is 2.67% on average, while the median is 0.12%. Equity
pay-performance sensitivity is 5.14%, while the median is 0.83%. The average debt to equity
pay-performance sensitivity is 5.14. However, the median is only 0.19. Out of the 5,447
firm-year observations, 28% exhibits a debt bias.
In Table 3.1 Panel B and C, we present summary statistics for subsamples with an
equity bias and a debt bias. Firms with a debt bias have an average debt of $2 billion,
while firms with an equity bias have an average debt of $1.6 billion. Firms with a debt bias
have an average debt of $13 billion, while firms with an equity bias have an average debt
of $5 billion. Firms with a debt bias have an average market leverage of 0.246, while firms
with an equity bias have an average market leverage of 0.634. Firms with a debt bias have
an average equity volatility of 35%, while firms with an equity bias have an average equity
volatility of 45%. In summary, firms with a debt bias appear to have larger size and smaller
market leverage, and exhibit smaller equity volatility and smaller equity pay-performance
sensitivity. These statistics are consistent with those documented in this literature.
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3.4 Simulation results
This section starts by presenting the set of project selection problems that a hypothetical
firm faces when the CEO has some hypothetical debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity,
ranging from 0 to 10. The hypothetical firm has a mean or median level of firm debt, equity
and equity volatility. Then the summary statistics for firms’ project selection problems are
presented using observed CEO debt and equity incentive compensation for each individual
firm. Finally, we present summary statistics for firms’ project selection problems for both
the observed CEO debt and equity incentive compensation, and only the observed CEO
equity incentive compensation.
3.4.1 A hypothetical firm with hypothetical contracts
In this section, we describe the project selection problem for a hypothetical firm with
hypothetical incentive contracts. This will help quantify the project selection problems and
provide a benchmark for individual firm analysis.
In Table 3.2, we evaluate the project selection problem for a sample firm with mean
value of firm debt, firm equity and equity volatility. First as the procedure outlined in
Section 3.2, the firm value and firm volatility are calculated by assuming the sample firm
has a zero coupon debt equal to the mean value of firm debt in the whole sample, and the
zero coupon debt matures in 5 years. For each hypothetical debt to equity pay-performance
sensitivity which varies from 0 to 1 and a 10% increase (decrease) in firm volatility (not
equity volatility), the cutoff value for the negative (positive) NPV projects that the CEO
will take (forgo) is calculated for a CEO with equity bias compensation. Similarly, for each
hypothetical debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity which varies from 1 to 10 and a
10% decrease (increase) in firm volatility (not equity volatility), the cutoff value for the
negative (positive) NPV projects that the CEO will take (forgo) is calculated for a CEO
with debt bias compensation. Both the cutoff value and the cutoff value as a proportion of
firm market value are reported. The cutoff value for negative NPV projects is the smallest
negative NPV project that the CEO will take. And the cutoff value for positive NPV
projects is the largest positive NPV project that the CEO will forgo. For example, for
a CEO with zero debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity, with 10% decrease in firm
volatility, the CEO will not take any positive NPV projects with NPV smaller than $6.11
million. For the same CEO with zero debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity, with 10%
increase in firm volatility, the CEO will take any negative NPV projects with NPV bigger
than negative $10.16 million. These cutoff values represent 0.065% and 0.108% of firm
market value, respectively. As the distortion in debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity
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gets smaller, i.e., closer to 1, the cutoff value and the cutoff value as a proportion of firm
market value decrease. For example, with a 10% decrease in firm volatility, a CEO with debt
to equity pay-performance sensitivity equal to 0.1 will not take any positive NPV projects
unless its NPV exceeds 0.058% of firm value. On the other hand, with a 10% decrease
in firm volatility, a CEO with debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity equal to 0.9 will
not take any positive NPV projects unless its NPV exceeds 0.006% of firm value. When
the debt pay-performance sensitivity equals equity pay-performance sensitivity, there is no
project selection problem and correspondingly the cutoff value is zero.
A similar pattern exists for firms with a debt bias in their CEO compensation. As
the distortion in debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity gets larger, i.e., further from
the value of 1, the cutoff value and the cutoff value as a proportion of firm market value
increase. For example, with a 10% decrease in firm volatility, a CEO with debt to equity
pay-performance sensitivity equal to 2 will take any negative NPV project as long as its
negative NPV is smaller than 0.065% of firm value. On the other hand, with a 10% decrease
in firm volatility, a CEO with debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity equal to 9 will
take any negative NPV project as long as its negative NPV is smaller than 0.511% of firm
value. Note that debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity equal to 9 represents a bigger
distortion than debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity equal to 2.
It is also noteworthy that the distortion arisen when debt and equity pay-performance
sensitivity are not equal is not symmetric. For example, debt to equity pay-performance
sensitivity equal to 0.5 represents that the debt pay-performance sensitivity is half of
equity pay-performance sensitivity. Debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity equal to 2
represents that the equity pay-performance sensitivity is half of debt pay-performance sensi-
tivity. With a 10% decrease in firm volatility, a CEO with debt to equity pay-performance
sensitivity equal to 2 will take any negative NPV projects as long as its negative NPV
is smaller than 0.065% of firm value. On the other hand, with a 10% increase in firm
volatility, a CEO with debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity equal to 0.5 will take any
negative NPV project as long as its negative NPV is smaller than 0.054% of firm value.
Even more drastically, with a 10% increase in firm volatility, a CEO with debt to equity
pay-performance sensitivity equal to 2 will not take any positive NPV project unless the
positive NPV is larger than 0.107% of firm value. On the other hand, with a 10% decrease
in firm volatility, a CEO with debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity equal to 0.5 will
not take any positive NPV project unless the positive NPV is larger than 0.032% of firm
value.
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In untabulated tables, we study project selection problems for the same sample firm
except that the debt maturity is set to be 7 years. We also study project selection problems
for the same sample firm with debt maturity equal to 5 years but facing a 20% increase
(decrease) in firm volatility changes when calculating cutoff values. There is a pattern that
the project selection problems get more severe when the debt maturity is longer and when
the CEO has a greater influence on firm volatility.
As described in Section 3.3, firm debt and equity value are highly skewed. Hence in
untabulated tables, we study the project selection problems for a sample firm with median
firm debt and equity value, median equity volatility. The results are similar to those in
previous panels in Table 3.2.
3.4.2 Firms with existing contracts
In this section, the project selection problems are calculated using each individual firm’s
face value of debt, market value of equity, equity volatility and each individual CEO’s
observed debt and equity incentive compensation. As the project selection problem takes
completely opposite sign for firms with a debt bias and an equity bias in CEO compensation,
the results for firms with a debt bias and an equity bias in CEO compensation are presented
separately in Table 3.3 Panel A and Panel B. Similar to Table 3.2, the cutoff values for
project selection problems are calculated using debt maturity of 5 years and 7 years, and a
10% and 20% changes in firm volatility.
It is worth noting that under the assumptions in Section 3.2, the distortions introduced
by either an equity bias, or a debt bias in CEO compensation is trivial. This is not surprising
in the sense that the firms in the sample are those in the S&P 1500 index and are in good
financial health. To see how sensitive the results are to the assumption of changes in firm
volatility, the project selection problems are calculated when assuming the CEO can change
the firm volatility by 90%. The magnitudes of the cutoff value as a proportion of firm value
are still not very large, with a mean of 4% at most.
3.5 A potential friction
It is worth noting that under the assumptions in Section 3.2, the distortions introduced
by either an equity bias, or a debt bias in CEO compensation are trivial. This is calculated
assuming that the firm manager makes a single investment decision, based on current firm
parameters. We further research how relevant are the results to real world firms which
make a series of investment decisions over time, based on parameters (like firm value) that
will only become known later. One potential friction omitted from current quantification is
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renegotiation cost of managerial contracts. The rationale is that the current contract is set
to help alleviate investment distortions in the future with revealed new asset price.
In this section, we explore the possibility that there are significant renegotiation costs
for managerial contracts. The rationale is that the current agency costs of debt are minimal;
however there are significant renegotiation costs. Hence, the observed managerial contracts
are set in a level that helps alleviate the agency costs of debt when firms experience negative
shocks and hence significant decline in market value. In Table 3.4, we present summary
statistics of investment distortions for firms one year from now. The results are similar to
those in Table 3.3. We decrease the equity value to half of the current value and recalculate
the agency costs of debt. For firms with an equity bias, the related costs are still minimal.
The type of positive (negative) projects that CEO will forgo (take) are on average 0.5% of
asset value. However, for firms with a debt bias, the type of positive (negative) projects that
CEO will forgo (take) are on average 17% of asset value. This manifests a fact that arises
from the simulation exercise. The costs related to project choice are not symmetrical. For
a certain amount of distress risk, the costs related to a debt bias are much more prominent
than the costs related to an equity bias. This is not surprising in the sense that debt holders
prefer to invest in t-bills if things are risky enough to leave debt risky. The 17% of asset
value potential loss indicates that for firms with a debt bias, if the firm’s equity decreases
by half, the related agency costs of debt can be significant. This raises the question of why
firms give CEO more inside debt in the first place. If project choice costs are the main
concern to use inside debt, it is puzzling why firms do not stop giving their chief executive
officers inside debt when debt to equity pay-performance sensitivity equals one.
3.6 The role of inside debt in optimal contracting
In particular, we double the existing debt face value and recalculate the potential
investment distortions in Table 3.5. The magnitudes are around 2% of the underlying asset
value when the projects are associated with a 10% change in firm volatility. This indicates
that firms in the sample can double their debt outstanding and the agency costs of debt
are still minimal in this numerical setup. This result indicates that agency costs of debt do
not appear to explain the under-leverage puzzle. We consider a potential friction that may
prevent the firm from using more debt, i.e., a cost of renegotiating managerial contracts.
We test whether the existing magnitudes of debt incentives are crucial if the firm continues
to receive negative shocks to their asset value. We decrease the firm’s equity value by half
and recalculate the potential investment distortions in Table 3.6. For firms with an equity
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bias, the magnitudes run around 2% of the asset value when the projects are associated
with 10% change in firm volatility. However, for firms with a debt bias, the magnitudes
run around 20% of the asset value when the projects are associated with 10% change in
firm volatility. These distortions are significant and it is hard to justify the rationale that
inside debt is used to alleviate investment related costs. One possible explanation is that
the firms with a debt bias are financially healthy and it is not quite possible that the firms’
equity will decrease significantly.
Inside debt helps align managerial incentives with those of external debt holders, while
inside equity helps align managerial incentives with those of external equity holders. Intu-
itively, inside debt (inside equity) represents debt (equity) incentives in CEO compensation
as it links CEO compensation directly to the payoffs of debt (equity) holders. The agency
problem between the manager and equity holders and the conflict between equity holders
and debt holders has been separately and well researched. Further, this exercise helps
quantify the investment distortion associated with the agency costs of debt.
This intuition has been explored in the empirical inside debt literature. There is mixed
empirical evidence about whether inside debt is used to alleviate the agency costs of debt.
On one hand, inside debt helps align CEO incentives with external debt holders and induce
less risky firm policies. In 2007, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission disclosure reform
required firms to disclose CEOs’ inside debt positions. In response to this disclosure, Wei
and Yermack (2012) show that for firms with sizeable inside debt, bond prices rise and equity
prices fall. Cassell et al. (2012) further show that inside debt is correlated with less risky
investment and financial policies. Specifically, they show that CEO inside debt holdings
are positively correlated with asset liquidity and negatively correlated with research and
development expenditures and financial leverage. On the other hand, in Chapter 2 we show
that less distressed firms provide more debt incentives, contrary to the prediction of an
equilibrium principal agent model. In this chapter, we attempt to directly quantify the
magnitudes of project choice problems introduced by the relative magnitudes of debt and
equity incentives.
Edmans and Liu (2011) model both the effort choice and project selection problem in
an equilibrium model, where the firm is maximizing firm value by choosing the incentive
contracts. They show that granting the manager equal proportions of debt and equity
may not always be optimal when project choice is not the only concern. An equity bias
is desired to induce effort for most situations. However, when bankruptcy is likely or the
manager is efficient in increasing bankruptcy value, a debt bias is preferred. Edmans and
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Liu (2011) help lay out the interplay between effort choice problem and project selection
problem. The intuition is that the relative efficiency for the manager to increase solvency
and bankruptcy value and the project selection problem are simultaneously evaluated in
equilibrium. However, they also note that the two problems can get very complex even under
specific assumptions that mechanically separated the two problems. The results in Section
3.4.2 indicate that the project selection problem is trivial for observed debt and equity
incentive compensation. As outlined in Section 3.2, the equity incentive compensation
is used to help align managerial incentives with those of equity holders, while the debt
incentive compensation is used to help align managerial incentives with those of debt holders.
At the same time, the relative weight between debt and equity incentive compensation
will introduce related project selection problems. There has been substantial evidence
indicating that equity incentives play an important role in optimal contracting. Hence,
we research the related project selection problems introduced by the observed magnitudes
of equity incentives. Similar to former results, the cutoff value of underinvestment and
overinvestment problem as a proportion of firm market value is small even without debt
incentives to mitigate the project selection problem. For firms with an equity bias in CEO
compensation, the usage of inside debt only helps improve the project selection problem
marginally. For firms with a debt bias in CEO compensation, the usage of inside debt
introduces bigger project selection problem.
Overall, the simulation results indicate that the project selection problem arisen from
the debt or equity bias in CEO compensation does not appear to be large in magnitude.
Further, we assume that the equity incentives are used to induce effort and debt incentives
are used to mitigate project selection problems. We show that the magnitudes of related
project selection problems are small even without related debt incentives. For firms with an
equity bias in CEO compensation, the usage of inside debt only helps improve the project
selection problem marginally. For firms with a debt bias in CEO compensation, the usage
of inside debt introduces bigger project selection problem, although marginally.
The low agency costs of debt presented in Section 3.4 further contribute to the under-
leverage puzzle. We increase the firm’s outstanding debt to twice the level of existing face




As a supplemental analysis, we calculate the savings from deferral of personal taxes since
CEOs can defer taxes on inside debt until withdrawal. The average age for the CEO in the
sample is 55 years old. We assume that all CEOs retire at age of 65 and face a marginal
tax rate of 40%. We assume all CEOs get a lump sum of their pension and deferred
compensation at the age of 65 and the risk free rate is 5%. Under these assumptions, we
calculate the difference between the taxes that they have to pay today and those at age
of 65. The difference is $0.58 million dollars on average, and the median is only $0.07
million dollars. This difference appears to be small in magnitude to explain that personal
tax concern is a main driver for inside debt usage.
3.8 Conclusion
The investment distortions arising from the conflict between debt holders and equity
holders have been one major argument supporting firms’ optimal contracting, and one of
the key frictions behind firms’ financing choices. This chapter uses numerical methods to
quantify investment distortions in a setup that takes managerial incentives into consider-
ation. We analyze the project selection problem in which the manager makes investment
decisions conditional on both equity and debt incentives in his contract. Quantifying the
magnitudes of investment distortions is important to understand their relative importance
in optimal contracting with managers and firms’ financing decisions.
The intuition of inside debt to mitigate agency costs of debt is straightforward. However,
the empirical evidence has been mixed. Furthermore, there is no formal analysis by linking
the theoretical modeling to observed optimal contracts. In this chapter, we adopt the
Merton (1974) framework and quantify the distortion in project selection problem.
Merton (1974) models the equity of the firm as a call option on the underlying asset of the
firm with the strike price equal to the face value of the firm’s debt. We attempt to shed light
on the firm’s rationale for inside debt usage by quantifying the project selection problem.
Given the observed magnitudes of equity incentives and debt incentives in chief executive
officer compensation, we first characterize the set of NPV projects that CEOs prefer to
forego and the set of negative NPV projects that CEOs want to accept. The magnitudes
of underinvestment and overinvestment problems appear to be small on average in my
sample. The observed magnitudes of inside debt are hard to reconcile with the hypothesis
that providing debt incentives is the main reason for inside debt. Finally, the savings from


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this appendix, we describe how the variables used in this dissertation are constructed
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Let Return stand for any return that we use in the paper, for example four-factor-model
abnormal return, CAPM abnormal return or raw return. Cumulative return for an event
window is defined as the sum of each daily return for the particular event window. For
example, for event window from t = l to t = k, Cumulative returnl to k = Returnl +
Returnl+1+· · ·+Returnk−1+Returnk. The corresponding t-statistic that measures whether
the cumulative return is significantly different from zero over the t = l to t = k event window
is calculated using the dependence adjustment method as described by Brown and Warner
(1985) with a holdout period t = l− 30 to t = l− 1 (we use 30 time periods in this paper).
Specifically, we first calculate the variance of Return in the holdout period and let σ2holdout
stand for it. And the t-statistic is specified as: Cumulative returnl to k / square root of
(σ2holdout ∗ (k − l + 1)).
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